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toisissa eivät. Näin ollen asianajosalaisuuteen vetoamisella voi olla merkittäviä vaikutuksia saatavilla olevan todistusaineiston 
kannalta, ja välimiehen on lopulta ratkaistava minkä säännösten perusteella asianajosalaisuuden laajuus määritetään. 
 
Asianajosalaisuutta pidetään siinä määrin merkittävänä ja yleisesti tunnustettuna oikeutena, että osapuolten odotuksia sen 
voimassa olon suhteen sekä heidän oikeuttaan vedota siihen on pidetty perusteltuina myös kansainvälisessä 
välimiesmenettelyssä. Asianajosalaisuuden perustuessa perinteisesti kansalliseen lainsäädäntöön tai kansallisiin eettisiin 
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sovelletaan molempiin osapuoliin. 
 
On kuitenkin epäselvää, kuinka välimiehen tulee valita asianajosalaisuuteen sovellettava laki kansainvälisessä 
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pidetty erityisen perusteltuina etsittäessä asianajosalaisuuteen sovellettavaa lakia kansainvälisessä välimiesmenettelyssä.  
 
Läheisimmän liitynnän periaatteen lisäksi välimies voi päätyä soveltamaan niin sanottua suotuisimman valtion lakia eli lakia, joka 
tarjoaa kattavinta suojaa asianajosalaisuuden piirissä oleville tiedoille. Tätä lähestymistapaa on pidetty toivottavana etenkin 
osapuolten tasapuolisuuden kannalta, sillä se mahdollistaa saman säännöksen soveltamisen molempiin osapuoliin. Soveltamalla 
sen osapuolen kotimaan lakia, joka tarjoaa kattavimman suojan asianajosalaisuuden piirissä, välimies antaa osapuolille samat 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
As an important principle acknowledged in most jurisdictions, legal privilege protects the 
confidentiality of communications between lawyer and client. Legal privilege therefore 
often limits the use of certain documents or information as evidence in legal proceedings. 
However, in international arbitration claims to legal privilege are causing controversy as it 
is unclear how arbitrators should deal with them.  
The parties in international arbitral proceedings may try to invoke legal privilege especially 
in connection with disclosure, when parties, often justifiably, object disclosure requests or 
orders with claims to legal privilege. As document disclosure is quite a common feature in 
modern arbitral proceedings, any possibilities to counter disclosure become more and 
more relevant; this is why legal privilege can prove important in practice. 
Arbitrators can face difficulties when dealing with legal privilege mainly because there 
exists no uniform understanding as to which law should be applied to legal privilege in 
international arbitral proceedings and how such a law should be chosen. When searching 
a solution, an arbitrator has to take into consideration the different procedural principles 
of arbitration and the expectations parties’ likely have with regards to legal privilege.  
Problems regarding legal privilege in international arbitration are largely due to the close 
relationship between legal privilege and national legislation, and the fact that parties tend 
to expect communications protected by legal privilege to remain confidential also when 
they enter into arbitration. Legal privilege in some form is found in most jurisdictions, but 
its specific scope and nature vary depending on the details of the national law and local 
social interests at issue. In international arbitration, parties commonly base their claims 
on these domestic rules of legal privilege, which can cause tensions to arise when parties 
from different jurisdictions each expect their own rules of legal privilege to apply. 
Cultural variations regarding legal privilege are at the root of related problems 
experienced in international arbitration, with variations between common law and civil 
law approaches to legal privilege being a good example. For instance, in civil law 
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jurisdictions the origins of legal privilege lay in the concept of professional secret and the 
protection of the integrity of the legal profession, whereby legal privilege is closely related 
to other professional privileges, such as a doctor's or priest's privilege.  On the other hand 
in common law, the need for legal privilege has been closely connected with the need to 
protect parties from the extensive discovery system which is an essential part of the truth 
seeking procedures in common law jurisdictions. 
In practice, the status of in-house counsel is a subject commonly discussed in related 
commentaries, as under civil law in-house counsel are often not seen independent 
enough to enjoy the benefits of legal privilege, whereas under common law they are 
usually protected by legal privilege just as any private practitioners. Waiver of privileges 
can also prove problematic as, for instance, in the United States legal privilege belongs to 
the client and not the lawyer, therefore making it possible for a party to waive its privilege 
without the lawyer's consent. In civil law countries, the lawyer’s secrecy obligation can be 
far stricter, so that lawyers might not be allowed to waive the professional secrecy 
protecting a document even if the client has waived the privilege. 
These cultural differences cause practical problems in international arbitration and often 
force arbitrators to find some compromise solution. An arbitrator cannot easily dismiss 
claims concerning such well-recognized procedural rights as legal privilege, whereby the 
arbitrator is usually left with the challenging task of deciding which law or rule to apply to 
legal privilege while adhering to requirements of due process, especially party equality. 
Also, the public policy nature of legal privileges leads to the fact that such claims are to be 
taken seriously, and their halting effect on the proceedings demands that such claims are 
dealt with swiftly in order to continue with the proceedings. This, however, can be more 
easily said than done in international arbitration. 
The arbitrator faced with a claim to legal privilege has to determine which law of legal 
privilege should be applied in the case at hand. National arbitration acts and arbitration 
rules tend to mention legal privilege very seldom, whereby the choice made by the 
arbitrator is very much a matter of arbitral discretion.  
The process which arbitrators can apply when dealing with matters of legal privilege can 
be described as follows. First of all, the arbitrator is to decide whether legal privilege is in 
fact a procedural matter or a substantive matter, as this separation can have an effect on 
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the final choice of law. Second, using conflict of laws rules or other means as a tool, the 
arbitrator has to choose which of the numerous laws related with the case and the 
communications is to be used in resolving the privilege dispute. Third, and often most 
importantly, the arbitrator has to secure the fair and equal treatment of the parties 
throughout this process regarding legal privilege. Neglecting this core principle of arbitral 
proceedings puts at risk the arbitrator's key task of rendering a final award. 
The status of disclosure proceedings in modern international arbitration is rather well 
established and claims to legal privilege are in practice a significant category of objections 
whereby any irregularities or difficulties in solving privilege disputes can postpone 
unnecessarily the rendering of the award. Arbitrators should have efficient and 
predictable means to resolve such disputes and parties should be aware of the true status 
of legal privilege in international arbitration before entering into arbitration. This thesis 
seeks to shed light on these important factors.  
1.2. Research questions and methodology 
The emphasis of the thesis is on the status of legal privilege in international arbitration 
and the methods available for arbitrators in resolving privilege related disputes in 
international arbitration. The research questions thus are: 
1.  What are the main concerns related with legal privilege in international arbitration? 
2. How can arbitrators choose the applicable law of legal privilege in international 
arbitration?  
The thesis is a legal dogmatic research which uses legislation and institutional arbitration 
rules as well as legal commentaries as its main sources. The supply of legislation regarding 
the subject at issue is very limited but reference is made to the most relevant national 
arbitration acts and institutional rules as well as other arbitration guidelines. As to legal 
literature, reference is made especially to those international commentaries which are 
most recognized as sources on the subject at issue.  
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1.3. Structure, scope and terminology 
Chapter 2 seeks to present the contours of the discretionary approach an arbitrator is to 
take in order to reach a final decision on which law to apply to legal privilege. The chapter 
will first introduce legal privilege in general, its purpose in a judicial system and the 
different approaches taken to it, especially in some civil and common law jurisdictions. 
Next, the most important considerations affecting the choice of privilege law will be 
presented; mainly party equality, legitimate expectations and the finality of an award will 
be discussed. As legal privilege disputes are in essence dilemmas of choice of law, the 
chapter will also present the potentially applicable law of legal privilege, the problem of 
qualifying legal privilege as procedural or substantive and some points regarding 
arbitrator’s powers to make a choice of law decision in general. Finally, relevant regulatory 
sources concerning arbitration will be analyzed in search for guidance on how approach 
legal privileges and how to choose a law of legal privilege. 
Chapter 3 is aimed at presenting the situations and concerns which are especially relevant 
with regards to legal privilege and its occurrence in international arbitral proceedings. 
Their use as objections to disclosure will be discussed with a special emphasis on the 
possibilities of an arbitrator to react to unfounded privilege claims. The problems with de 
facto determination of what is privileged needs to be discussed as well as the commonly 
recognized problems regarding the status of in-house counsel communications and waiver 
of legal privilege. Privilege disputes may also necessitate consideration of lawyer’s ethical 
standards in the arbitral proceedings, whereby their status in international arbitration will 
be introduced. Finally, by taking into consideration all that has been presented on legal 
privilege disputes, Chapter 3 will present some proposed solutions which would likely help 
the arbitrator reach a reasonable and sustainable resolution to any privilege dispute.   
As to the concept of legal privilege, it is one of many different privileges. Generally, legal 
privilege, settlement privilege, trade secret privilege and state secret privilege1 are 
considered as the most relevant types of privilege in the field of international arbitration. 
In addition to these, one can mention the privilege against self-incrimination, spousal 
communications and clergy-penitent privilege.2 As often mentioned in commentaries on 
                                                          
1 This privilege is sometimes referred to as crown privilege. 
2 Kaufmann-Kohler & Bärtsch p.19, Alvarez p.667. 
5 
 
privilege in international arbitration, the number, nature, scope and effect of privileges 
varies significantly between different jurisdictions. The scope of this thesis is, however, 
limited to legal privilege, although approaches and considerations presented could well 
apply to situations concerning other privileges as well.  
This is not a comparative research regarding different regimes of legal privilege, whereby 
the statutory basis and detailed nature of legal privilege is only presented to the extent 
necessary when describing the cultural variations and practical problems faced in 
international arbitration. In introducing cultural variations between common law and civil 
law, section 2.1.3 will introduce some common law approaches to legal privilege, such as 
those adopted in the United States and England, and some civil law approaches, such as 
those adopted in Finland and France.  
As to the terminology being used, “arbitrator(s)” and “tribunal” are used interchangeably 
when referring to those faced with the final responsibility of resolving a legal privilege 
dispute in international arbitral proceedings. 
“Evidentiary privileges” can be defined as legally recognized rights, and in some cases 
obligations, to withhold certain testimonial or documentary evidence from a legal 
proceeding, including the right to prevent another from disclosing such information.3 
Legal privilege is an evidentiary privilege.  
“Legal privilege” is used as a general term to refer to the entitlement of a lawyer or party 
to arbitration or litigation to withhold a document or other evidence because of the 
special position of the lawyer.4 Other terms used when discussing similar protection, such 
as “attorney-client privilege”, will be used when referring to the specific protection 
provided in a certain jurisdiction, such as the United States.  
 “Privilege(s)” as a general term will refer to legal privilege, but much of that discussed in 
this thesis can possibly be applied to solving disputes regarding other privileges as well, 
even if such other privileges are not presented in detail in this thesis. 
                                                          
3 Berger p.503 and Alvarez p.665. 
4 This definition has been borrowed from von Schlabrendorff & Sheppard, p. 744. 
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“Privilege disputes” are used as a reference to the situation where an arbitrator is faced 
with several potentially applicable laws or rules of legal privilege and a decision on what 
should be applied.  
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2. Outlining arbitrator’s discretionary approach to legal privilege 
It is argued in this chapter that a choice of law solution reached by an arbitrator regarding 
a legal privilege dispute will have to result from careful consideration of due process 
principles, such as party equality, and take into account the legitimate expectations of the 
parties regarding the confidentiality of communications between them and their lawyers. 
Due process is a core principle in arbitral proceedings, whereby its breach has the 
potential of jeopardizing the finality of an arbitral award. As legislation and institutional 
sources provide only limited guidance with respect to the choice of a law of legal 
privilege, the resolution of a legal privilege dispute will mostly be based on arbitrator’s 
discretion.  
After introducing the nature of legal privilege in general and some of the cultural 
variations of it, this chapter will present the key principles of arbitral proceedings affecting 
any choice of privilege law. In addition, the relevant parts of the arbitral choice of law 
regime will be explored as well as the problems regarding the qualification of legal 
privilege as procedural or substantive. 
2.1. The nature of legal privilege 
In order to properly understand the status of legal privilege in international arbitration it is 
necessary to first examine its nature, scope and purpose in a general manner. This section 
will explore the importance of legal privilege in a judicial system and the reasons why it 
should be respected in international arbitral proceedings. It will also present in a brief 
manner some common categorizations of legal privilege, for example, with respect to 
other privileges. Although legal systems tend to recognize the importance of legal 
privilege, there exists no uniform concept of legal privilege, whereby it is important to 
explore some of the most relevant cultural variations regarding legal privilege. This is 
increasingly important as most problems related to legal privilege in international 
arbitration are due to these cultural variations concerning its nature and scope.  
2.1.1. Why does legal privilege matter? 
What is it that we are protecting and why are we doing it? The rationale behind legal 
privilege can be found from some of the core principles of legal theory. As one 
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commentator rightly emphasized, the ancient axiom that everyone is presumed to know 
the law is one of the essential underpinnings in most legal systems, and that as a result, to 
know the law everyone can seek help from a lawyer.5 One principle intertwined with this 
idea is that anyone wanting legal help should be able to seek it without incurring any 
danger.6 The communication between a lawyer and his client must be confidential, as 
otherwise those seeking help could hesitate presenting any questions which would cause 
law to remain a “closed book” and, finally, make it impossible to fulfill the presumption of 
everyone knowing the law.7 As society deems it beneficial that its people have access to 
legal advice without fear or concern, there is a clear societal interest for the existence of 
legal privilege. This is an important reason why protection of communications between 
lawyers and clients has existed in some form for centuries and still exists today.8 
The following statement included in a ruling by an English judge serves as an appropriate 
example of the rationale behind legal privilege: 
"A man must be able to consult with his lawyer in confidence, since otherwise 
he might hold back half the truth. (…) Legal professional privilege is … much 
more than an ordinary rule of evidence, limited in its application to the facts 
of a particular case. It is a fundamental condition on which the administration 
of justice as a whole rests."9 
Undoubtedly, if we are to seek some common grounds for the existence of legal privilege, 
it seems that the need to support and protect candid communications between lawyer 
and client is at the core of legal privilege. This need is also connected with public policy as 
a functioning judicial system arguably necessitates the availability of legal advice to 
individuals. Indeed, the importance of legal privilege seems to be so well established and 
called for that it is considered to be a “fundamental condition” of the administration of 
justice.10 
The confidentiality of communications between lawyer and client is a fundamental 
procedural right also under Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
                                                          
5 Burkard, p.685. 
6 ibid. 
7 ibid. 
8 See Hill at p. 173, who argues that with the legal world as complex as it is, individuals who are 
not lawyers cannot function “efficiently or effectively” in the adversary system without proper 
assistance or the possibility to search advice on the law. 
9 R v. Derby, Magistrates' Court [1996] AC 487 at 507, cited in Heitzmann at p. 219. 
10 ibid.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
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(hereinafter: “ECHR”), which protect the right to a fair trial and the right to privacy, 
respectively.11 However, legal privilege as understood under ECHR is not an absolute rule 
as it always demands a case-by-case analysis with regards to the requirements of a fair 
trial, as well as the right to privacy, in the given circumstances.12 ECHR may not be 
applicable in arbitral proceedings13, but the convention is an undisputable indication of 
the fact that the confidentiality of communications between client and lawyer is a well 
acknowledged procedural right, which as such cannot be blatantly neglected even by 
arbitrators due to the essential public policy nature of legal privilege.14 
In addition to the status of legal privilege as a fundamental procedural right, the 
fundamental principles of arbitral proceedings itself demand arbitrators to take any 
privilege claims seriously at the outset. As part of the “Magna Carta” of arbitration, due 
process is a core principle of arbitration,15 and as a part of due process, each party 
deserves a reasonable chance to put their case and be treated equally and fairly.16  
Also the parties’ legitimate expectations as to their rights being respected necessitate 
arbitrators to take privilege claims into consideration and provide parties’ with the 
protection of legal privilege if need be. Should an arbitrator outright deny a party's claim 
of privilege or alternatively apply different privilege rules to different parties, which 
certainly is possible due to the national variations in privilege rules, the final award might 
very well be challenged by the wronged party. 
Legal privilege thus is of a certain public policy nature.17 It is often considered to reflect 
the public policy of the jurisdiction that has adopted it, whereby a failure to apply the 
                                                          
11 Alvarez, p.670. See also Sindler & Wüstemann at p.633, fn.62 quoting case an English case 
General Mediterranean Holdings Sa v Patel & Anor. In the case, the English court found 
interference with the right to consult a lawyer of one's choosing to violate Article 6 of ECHR which 
guarantees the right to a fair hearing, including legal assistance. Interference with correspondence 
between lawyer and client can also infringe the principle of respect for privacy enshrined in Article 
8 of ECHR. 
12 von Schlabrendorff & Sheppard, p. 755. 
13 See Poudret & Besson at p. 65. Legal scholars are divided on the question of the applying ECHR 
in arbitral proceedings. Arbitrators might not be bound by the convention directly, but if it has 
been incorporated into the national judicial system of the seat of the arbitration, arbitrators could 
come to respect it indirectly as procedural public policy. 
14 See Sinlder & Wüstemann at p.634 for the discussion on human rights in arbitration. 
15 Lew, Mistelis et al., p.95. 
16 ibid. 
17 Alvarez, p. 664. 
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privilege could cause the setting aside of the arbitral award or refusal to recognize or 
enforce it by national courts.18 Thus, if nothing more, the more or less relevant connection 
between public policy and legal privilege demand arbitrators to take privilege claims 
seriously, if they are to fulfill their task of rendering a final award. 
2.1.2. Categorizing legal privilege 
Some categorizations can be made to further clarify the nature of legal privilege. First of 
all, evidentiary privileges, such as legal privilege, are different from most rules of evidence 
in an important manner. In addition, evidentiary privileges are to be kept apart from 
information privileges. Finally, privileges in general can be divided into absolute and 
qualified privileges. 
Legal and other evidentiary privileges are different from most evidentiary rules which aim 
to ensure that reliable and probative evidence may be presented in a coherent and 
orderly fashion.19 Legal privilege, on the other hand, is based on social values, which as 
such are external to the trial process. Evidentiary rules are intended to exclude evidence 
“because of its inherent unreliability or lack of probative value, which are concerns 
related to the adversarial method of ascertaining the truth”.20 Unlike other rules of 
evidence, evidentiary privileges permit and sometimes require, due to social interests, the 
exclusion of evidence even if it is relevant, probative and reliable.21 This is a result of 
national courts and legislators evaluating that a loss in evidence is outweighed by the 
benefit to society from the existence of privileges.22 
As a further distinction, evidentiary or testimonial privileges, including legal privilege, are 
to be separated from information privileges. While evidentiary privileges aim to protect 
confidential communications, information privileges such as business or trade secrets 
have the purpose of promoting economic benefits from creating and exploiting the 
protected information. 23  Thus, the existence of an informational privilege is not 
conditioned upon continued confidentiality, but rather continued control over the 
                                                          
18 ibid. Grounds for setting aside awards and refusing enforcement are handled in more detail 
below in section 2.2.3. 
19 Shaughnessy, p. 465. 
20 Alvarez, p. 665. 
21 ibid. 
22 Shaughnessy 2007, p.465. 
23 Shaughnessy 2007, p.464. 
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exploitation of the economic value of the privileged information.24 The differences in the 
nature and extent of testimonial and information privileges can be important especially in 
view of waiver issues. While information privileges protect content, testimonial privileges 
protect communications, which means that information under a testimonial privilege can 
be admitted via a non-privileged channel if such a non-privileged channel is available.25 
Therefore, information which is confidential under legal privilege can be disclosed if a 
non-privileged channel is available.26 
Privileges can also be categorized into absolute and qualified privileges. With absolute 
privileges, its holder can refuse to testify or submit evidence under any circumstance, 
although some rare exceptions to this refusal exist even with absolute privileges, such as 
the inclusion of criminal acts in allegedly privileged communication. Qualified privileges, 
on the other hand, can usually be overcome more easily, e.g. in cases where the evidence 
is found necessary for a fair determination.27 However, legal privilege has been considered 
both absolute and qualified depending on the jurisdiction in question.28 
2.1.3. Introducing common law and civil law concepts of legal privilege 
Problems regarding legal privilege in international arbitration mostly have their roots in 
the fact that parties based in different jurisdictions or legal systems might not have similar 
expectations as to what is privileged and what is not. This is due to differences in national 
concepts of legal privilege, and such cultural variations can cause practical problems in 
international arbitration when an arbitrator is faced with a choice of privilege law 
decision. This section will provide a general look at the background of some national 
regimes concerning legal privilege.29 
                                                          
24 ibid. 
25 ibid. For more detailed discussion on the subject, see Shaughnessy at p. 255-256. 
26 Shaughnessy 2007, p.464. 
27 ibid. 
28 Mosk & Ginsburg, p. 346. See also von Schlabrendorff & Sheppard at p. 747-748 pointing out 
that under English law, once a document is found privileged, the privilege cannot be overridden by 
some higher public interest but only by waiver of the client or by statute. Legal privilege is thus 
absolute, as long as the communications are legitimate and lawful. See also Alvarez at p. 668-669 
and fn. 17-19 on Canadian courts finding solicitor-client privilege not absolute and subject to 
exceptions, although necessitating that it be as close as possible to absolute. Baudesson & Rosher 
describe the French professional secrecy obligation as being absolute at p. 42. 
29 The situation in the United States and England will be used as common law examples and the 
situation in Finland and France will be used as civil law examples. 
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In common law jurisdictions30, legal privilege is a rule of discovery and evidence31, due to 
the fact that its development is closely connected with obligations to disclose internal 
documents or communications under the discovery (in the United States) or disclosure (in 
England) proceedings followed in civil proceedings. As a crucial difference to civil law 
jurisdictions, under this common law tradition of evidentiary proceedings parties must 
often disclose all relevant documents, even those detrimental to their own case.32 With 
regards to disclosure proceedings, the term “document” can be defined quite broadly 
with internal and handwritten notes, emails, Board reports and other information all 
included under the obligation to disclose internal documents.33 In addition, obligations to 
produce usually extend to all documents which have been in the disclosing party’s 
possession, custody or control.34 Thus parties to civil proceedings in a common law 
jurisdiction are likely to disclose to the other party such documents which may in fact 
prove harmful to the disclosing party’s case. In this context, legal privilege has become 
relatively important because the intrusions made possible by discovery call for equally 
efficient means of defense. In practice, a successful claim to legal privilege can save a 
party from disclosing potentially negative documents to the adverse party. 
The exact scope of legal privilege is perhaps not similar in all common law jurisdictions, 
but in broader terms common law legal privilege has been described as a right to resist 
the (otherwise) compulsory disclosure of confidential information contained in a 
communication made orally or in writing between a lawyer (including an in-house 
counsel) and his client, where the statements or materials were made or brought into 
existence for the dominant purpose of obtaining or giving legal advice, or where the 
communications took place for use in existing or contemplated proceedings.35 
As a result of being closely connected with document disclosure proceedings, common 
law variants of legal privilege have developed into quite complex systems where several 
specific types or sections of legal privilege exist. For instance, the legal professional 
                                                          
30 Legal privilege exists under various names. Broadly speaking it is known in the United States as 
attorney-client privilege, in United Kingdom as legal professional privilege, in Canada as solicitor-
client privilege and in Australia as client legal privilege. See Sindler & Wüstemann at p.614. 
31 Rubinstein & Guerrina, p.591. 
32 Sindler & Wüstemann, p.614-615. 
33 Boudesson & Rosher, p. 45. 
34 ibid. 
35 Sindler & Wüstemann, p. 615. 
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privilege under English law is in fact a primary category which includes separately legal 
advice privilege, litigation privilege and joint and common interest privilege.36 Legal advice 
privilege covers communications between professional legal advisers and their clients, 
litigation privilege covers communications between professional legal advisers, clients and 
third parties made for the purpose of litigation, whether existing or contemplated, and 
joint and common interest privilege covers common interest in either the subject matter 
of the communication or the litigation, based on a shared interest of both parties in 
keeping the communication confidential.37  
While the common law legal privilege stems from the aforementioned need of a client to 
be protected from discovery, the civil law variant is based traditionally on the lawyer’s 
secrecy obligation, the violation of which often results in sanctions under criminal law.38 
As opposed to being a rule of discovery or evidence, civil law legal privilege can be 
described as a “professional secret” with professional ethics being central.39 The secrecy 
obligation of any professional, be it a lawyer, doctor or a priest, often originates from the 
same statute in criminal law.40 Originally, this was the case in Finland as well, where legal 
privilege used to be based wholly on chapter 38 section 3 paragraph 1 of the Criminal 
Code dating from 1889.41 However, as a result of the general reform of the Criminal Code 
in 199542, provisions of legal privilege were included in Section 5 c of the Advocates Act43, 
which provides as follows: 
                                                          
36 Capper and Zagonek, p. 23-24. 
37 Capper and Zagonek, p. 23-24. The classification, scope and extent of these different parts of 
legal professional privilege are based on a “significant body of English case law”, knowledge of 
which is most likely very limited to parties unfamiliar with the details of the English judicial 
system. In order to avoid surprises and the application of unwelcome rules, parties to 
international arbitration seated in an unfamiliar jurisdiction should make certain that the tribunal 
or the other counsel do not assume too readily that privilege rules of the seat should apply simply 
because the proceedings are located in a certain country. 
38 This is the case for instance in France and Finland, see below. According to Berger at p. 504, in 
civil law jurisdictions the focus is in some sense on the lawyer and the integrity and independence 
of the legal profession, instead of the client and his needs. 
39 Alvarez, p. 666. 
40 Esko, p. 10-11. 
41 Esko & Könkkölä, p. 355.  
42 The reform was brought in to force by government proposal 94/1993. 
43 The provision on legal privilege was first included into the Advocates Act as Section 5 b by 
government proposal 626/95, which came into force on 1 September 1995, and later changed into 
Section 5 c with the same tenor by government proposal 1249/99, which came into force on 1 
January 2000.  
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“An advocate or his assistant shall not, without due permission, disclose the 
secrets of an individual or family or business or professional secrets which 
have come to his knowledge in the course of his professional activity. 
Breach of the obligation of confidentiality provided for under paragraph 1 
above shall be punishable in accordance with chapter 38, section 1 or 2, of the 
[Criminal] Code, unless the law otherwise provides for more severe 
punishment for the act.”44 
This provision thus applies both to the advocate and his assistant.45 Importantly, attorneys 
and counsel are also prohibited to testify in respect of what the client has entrusted to 
him or her for the pursuit of the case, unless the client consents to such testimony, based 
on the Code of Judicial Procedure.46 
In France, professional secrecy has always been based on the criminal code. Currently, the 
obligation is based on Article 226-13 of the French Criminal Code47, which states as 
follows: 
“The disclosure of an information of a confidential nature by a person who is 
entrusted with such information, either by reason of their office or profession, 
or by reason of a mission or temporary position, is punishable by a year of 
imprisonment and a fine in an amount of 15 000 euros.”48 
This approach to confidential communication via criminal legislation speaks first and 
foremost of the fact that professional secrecy is heavily based on public interest. The 
potential punishment is not conditional on the harm caused to an individual but by the 
requirements of public interest in the sense that a professional confided with secrets 
cannot truly fulfill his task if the information is not duly protected.49 The maintenance of 
                                                          
44 Laki asianajajista, 12.12.1958/496. The Criminal Code provisions mentioned in Section 5 c of 
the Advocates Act include provisions on secrecy offence and secrecy violation with the former 
providing more severe punishments of fine or at most one year of imprisonment and the latter 
resulting in a fine. They came into force by government proposal 578/1995 on 1 September 1995. 
45 See e.g. Ylöstalo & Tarkka at p. 97-99. 
46 Chapter 17, section 23, paragraph 1(4) of the Finnish Code of Judicial Procedure 
(oikeudenkäymiskaari, 1.1.1734/4). However, the provision may face changes due to the current 
efforts of the Ministry of Justice to renew evidentiary provisions. 
47 Article 226-13 of Frech Criminal Code. 
48 Translation included in Baudesson & Rosher, p. 39. The original text of Article 226-13 in French 
reads as follows: ”La révélation d'une information à caractère secret par une personne qui en est 
dépositaire soit par état ou par profession, soit en raison d'une fonction ou d'une mission 
temporaire, est punie d'un an d'emprisonnement et de 15 000 euros d'amende.” 
49 See Baudesson & Rosher at p. 39 citing a commentary by Emilie Garcon on the matter. 
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public order demands that such professionals are “bound to remain silent” as otherwise 
people would not dare seek assistance should they fear disclosure of the secret.50 
In jurisdictions where legal privilege is an important matter of public policy, such as in 
France, the approach to confidentiality is often described as ad personam meaning that 
those communicating are central instead of the content as such.51 Such an approach 
emphasizes the lawyer’s role in keeping privileged information confidential. On the other 
hand, in common law the approach is said to be in rem to confidentiality so that the 
content of the communication is more important than the individuals involved.52 Under 
the latter approach, obligations to maintain confidentiality are not as strictly tied to the 
lawyer, whereby parties’ possibilities to waive a privilege are seen in a different light.53  
A strict professional secrecy obligation, which is closely connected with the independence 
of the professional, can result in stricter conditions for the overall applicability of the 
privilege, so that for example in-house counsel who are employed by their client, a 
corporation, are not protected under legal privilege.54 Such a strict professional secrecy 
obligation can also result in the protection of communications between lawyers instead of 
just protecting communication between lawyers and clients.55 
In conclusion, the different points of view that have been presented in this section 
provide some insight to the cultural variations regarding legal privilege. First of all, the 
connection which legal privilege has with disclosure proceedings in common law is 
important to bear in mind when trying to understand the relevance of legal privilege in 
international arbitration; after all, the disclosure proceedings followed in arbitration have 
their origins to some extent in common law. Some civil law variants of legal privilege, on 
                                                          
50 ibid. 
51 Baudesson & Rosher, p. 38. 
52 ibid. 
53 The subject of waiver will be discussed in detail in section 3.1.4 below. 
54 The status of in-house counsel with respect to legal privilege will be discussed in section 3.1.3 
below.  
55 In France attorneys’ secrecy obligations protect all communications between attorneys who are 
members of a French bar and also communications with foreign attorneys when the confidential 
character of the communication is explicitly expressed, see Rosher at p.80. See also Baudesson & 
Rosher at p. 43-44 for their critique on this chapter and for that of former President of the Bar, Mr. 
Brunois, who believed that correspondence exchanged between lawyers should not be 
confidential. Limitations can also exist as to who has the documents in their possession; for 
instance, in Japan, documents are only protected from seizure and discovery if they are in the 
possession of the lawyer. See Rubinstein & Guerrina at p. 596. 
16 
 
the other hand, are an example of a very strict professional secrecy obligation, where 
lawyers may face sanctions under criminal law if they breach the privilege. This can have 
important repercussions on the waiver of legal privilege also in international arbitral 
proceedings. Most importantly though, it is apparent that domestic regimes regarding 
legal privilege can be far apart, so that applying the domestic rules of legal privilege of 
both parties in the arbitral proceedings may result in an imbalance between the level of 
protection enjoyed by each party. 
2.2. Important arbitral considerations  
An arbitrator should always bear in mind certain considerations while searching for the 
applicable law of legal privilege. As these considerations dictate the whole process of 
resolving a privilege dispute, it is necessary to introduce them before going in detail to 
situations where legal privileges emerge in practice.  
The choice made by the arbitrator is likely to be affected by the principle of party equality. 
Therefore, it is necessary to explore the status of equal treatment as an important 
procedural principle in international arbitration.  
Privilege disputes are to an important extent also affected by the so called “legitimate 
expectations” of the parties which embody the ideas and expectations parties have with 
regards to legal privilege in arbitration and how privilege disputes should be resolved. 
Both of the above considerations can be relevant in view of the finality of an arbitral 
award. If party equality and party expectations are failed by an arbitral decision on a law 
of legal privilege, the arbitral award itself may become open to challenge. 
2.2.1. Party equality 
Party equality plays an important role in privilege disputes. For instance, one can ask if 
equal treatment means applying to each their domestic rules or finding a common rule to 
apply to each? Also, if a common rule is to be applied and it is the rule of one party and 
not the other, is that true equality?56 
The principle of equal treatment of parties is well established in international arbitration 
as a part of arbitral due process. Party equality is a general principle of arbitral 
                                                          
56 Waincymer, p. 807. 
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proceedings provided for in the UNCITRAL Model Law of International Commercial 
Arbitration (hereinafter: “the UNCITRAL Model Law”) at Article 18 stating that “the parties 
shall be treated equally” and it forms an essential part of the right to a fair trial under the 
ECHR.57 The equal treatment of parties, or equality of arms, is required under most 
national arbitration acts as well, for example those of Finland58 and Sweden59. With 
reference to international arbitration, French courts have stated that party equality must 
be observed “as a general principle of procedure founded in procedural public policy”60. In 
addition, the International Bar Association Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International 
Arbitration (hereinafter: “the IBA Rules”) 61 are aimed as guidelines for a fair process in 
the taking of evidence in international arbitration.62 
This principle is central to the question of legal privilege because it obligates an arbitrator 
to treat parties impartially in the sense that one party may not be denied a right which is 
accorded the other party. 63  While the proceedings may not be arranged in a 
discriminatory manner, the parties do not, however, have to be treated in an exactly 
similar manner.64 Instead, the principle is fulfilled when the parties are offered the same 
procedural rights and duties.65 
With the case of legal privilege in international arbitration, the principle of party equality 
is in danger if different rules of legal privilege are applied to different parties and the rules 
do not guarantee equal protection to confidential communications. This would likely 
result in party inequality if one party would be allowed to withhold certain information 
while the other party would have to disclose similar information.  
                                                          
57 von Schalbrendorff & Sheppard, p. 767. 
58 Finnish Arbitration Act, 23.10.1992/967, section 23 states that failing party agreement on 
procedure, ”the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers 
appropriate, subject to the provisions of this Act and taking into account the requirements of 
impartiality and speed” (emphasis added). 
59 Swedish Arbitration Act (SFS 1999:116), section 21 states that the ”arbitrators shall handle the 
dispute in an impartial, practical, and speedy manner. They shall thereupon act in accordance with 
the decisions of the parties insofar as there is no impediment to so doing.” (emphasis added) 
60 von Schlabrendorff & Sheppard, p. 766. 
61 The IBA Rules were adopted by a resolution of the IBA Council on 29 May 2010. 
62 See the foreword of the IBA Rules at p. 2. The IBA Rules are very relevant with respect to legal 
privilege in international arbitration as will be seen in following sections. 
63 Heuman, p. 260. 
64 Heuman, p. 261. 
65 ibid. 
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What is especially interesting with regards to legal privilege is the question of how do 
cultural variations affect the application of the principle of party equality. Evidently, 
international arbitration proceedings include parties with varying cultural backgrounds 
and litigating skills, a reality which is very relevant in view of legal privilege as well. In 
these situations, arbitrators may have to make compromises in order to protect party 
equality.  
During the arbitral proceedings, applying rules familiar to one side might naturally give 
them the upper hand in the arbitral proceedings.66 Parties will never be absolutely equal 
as resources and legal representation, to name a few, are likely to differ67, and taking 
counsel’s skills into consideration in attempts to find perfect equilibrium is likely to be 
very cumbersome in practice, if not utterly impossible. Efficiency and smoothness of the 
proceedings are to be secured as well, which will lead to the fact that “[v]ery often, 
extreme considerations of procedural fairness should defer to the need of pragmatic 
solution”68. This is often the reality with privilege disputes as well. Although one can 
question a party’s right to invoke a privilege when the original justification of such 
privilege does not apply to them, some sort of compromise between contradicting rules 
of legal privilege is necessary in order to resolve the dispute and continue with the 
proceedings, even if parties’ real abilities in putting their case for said privilege might not 
be absolutely equal. As Heuman concludes, the fact that one party can make a better case 
for a procedural right does not constitute a breach of the principle of equal treatment.69  
Therefore, when dealing with a privilege dispute, an arbitrator could provide the parties 
with similar procedural rights by choosing to apply one set of privilege rules to them both. 
This way, the risk of breaching the party equality principle by applying different rules to 
different parties would be avoided. 
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2.2.2. Legitimate expectations 
The rationale of protecting legal privilege in international arbitration can be justified by 
the legitimate, or reasonable, expectations of the parties. What, then, are those 
legitimate expectations of the parties which arbitrators have to take into consideration 
when dealing with legal privilege in international arbitration? Expecting the application of 
domestic rules and expecting equal treatment can both be considered reasonable, but 
which one should the tribunal choose?70  
First of all, parties to arbitration very often have the expectation that communications 
which were confidential when they were made will also remain confidential. Second, 
parties are likely to have the expectation that decisions made by the tribunal are made on 
the basis of applicable law. Third, parties who have consented to arbitration expect fair 
and equal treatment from the tribunal.71 
As regards the expectation of confidential communications staying confidential, it is of 
course a very understandable expectation. If this expectation would not be met, a party in 
question might argue that it would have expressed itself less candidly or not sought legal 
advice at all, which would of course be very problematic in view of the public policy 
considerations aimed at promoting the search of legal advice.72 This expectation is also at 
the root of the whole problem with regards to international arbitral proceedings because 
parties, who expect legal privilege to apply, make claims based on the domestic laws 
originally providing for confidentiality. These claims then require arbitrators to determine 
which of law is in fact most appropriate. 
The expectations concerning law and party equality are very much parallel to principles of 
due process as they basically call for predictable behavior and more certainty from the 
arbitrator’s part, and demand for equal and fair treatment of the parties, which is 
recognized as a core feature of any well-organized proceedings. Therefore, the legitimate 
expectations of the parties are the practical embodiment of the basic procedural 
principles which arbitrators have to take into consideration; thus the word “legitimate” so 
as to describe their justified nature. For instance, even if a certain party was not expecting 
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its in-house communications to be protected before a dispute, the party would still expect 
same rules to apply to all the parties.73 
Of course it might not always be a simple task for a tribunal to determine the exact 
expectations a party might have in a given case. Defining legitimate expectations might 
become more problematic with parties and counsel who are well accustomed with 
international arbitration and are thus familiar with problems regarding privileges, and 
who might have entered into arbitration for the very reason of avoiding application of 
domestic rules.74 In practice, party expectations are significant because the surprise of 
being denied such a fundamental procedural right as legal privilege simply because of 
choosing arbitration instead of litigation would likely be quite unreasonable.75 
2.2.3. Arbitrator’s discretion and finality of awards 
The above considerations of party equality and party expectations are significant as the 
procedural discretion of an arbitrator is only limited by the two primary principles of 
arbitration: party autonomy and the right to a fair hearing.76 These are the limits within 
which arbitrators are to use their discretion in solving legal privilege disputes. Park 
describes the limits of arbitral discretion as follows: 
“Arbitrators can conduct the proceedings in almost any manner they deem 
best, as long as they respect the arbitral mission and accord the type of 
fundamental fairness usually called ‘due process’ in the United States and 
‘natural justice’ in Britain, which includes both freedom from bias and allowing 
each side an equal right to be heard.”77 
This applies also to any discretionary decision the arbitrator makes on the applicable law 
of legal privilege. How is this discretion then limited by party autonomy or demands of 
due process? A descriptive point of view on the essence of party autonomy is expressed 
by Heuman: 
“Perhaps the party autonomy principle is important above all because the 
arbitrators should not make any procedural decisions without asking the 
parties how they want the proceedings to be conducted.”78 
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Indeed, arbitrator’s discretion is always limited by the fact that he cannot resort to purely 
arbitrary decisions but must in fact always consider the interest of the parties. Arbitrator’s 
discretion is certainly not an expression of a freedom to act purely according to the 
arbitrator’s own convenience.79 Instead, an arbitrator should take into consideration 
different interests and views expressed and proceed to a solution in a clear and 
understandable manner so as to stop any potentially harmful misunderstandings from 
emerging amongst the parties. 80  Even though endowed with broad discretion, an 
arbitrator is required to take a practical approach to the procedure, whereby the 
proceedings  
“must lead to an unchallengeable, substantively correct award and the 
procedure must be efficient in the sense of production of evidence and work 
input being reduced to the minimum extent”81. 
An arbitrator thus uses his discretion with the aim of providing an unchallengeable award. 
In order to succeed in this task, he must keep in mind the grounds for the setting aside of 
awards and for the refusal to recognize or enforce awards, of which the requirement of 
due process and considerations of public policy are most relevant in view of privilege 
disputes. Ultimately, the relevance of legal privilege is measured in this context as well; if 
the arbitrator resolves a privilege dispute in a manner which could be interpreted as a 
breach of these principles, the award itself could be set aside or found unenforceable.82  
First of all, arbitrators may find that their award is being challenged or refused recognition 
or enforcement due to non-compliance with requirements of due process. For example, 
article 34(2)(a)(ii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides, with regards to the setting aside 
of arbitral awards, as follows: 
“An arbitral award may be set aside by the court specified in article 6 only 
if…the party making the application furnishes proof that…the party making 
the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an 
arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his 
case” (emphasis added) 
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An article with similar wording is included in article 36(1)(a)(ii) 83 with regards to a refusal 
regarding recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award.84 
The above articles are the most important grounds for refusal of enforcement under the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and the New York Convention.85 A party’s right to “present his case” 
is essentially a reference to the requirement of due process, which is regarded as one of 
the principles which have to be guaranteed by an arbitral tribunal regardless of the 
procedure and the law chosen.86 One essential component of the principle of due process 
is that parties are treated equally and fairly.87 Thus considerations of equality and fairness 
have to be taken into serious consideration by any tribunal facing privilege claims because 
in the worst case unequal treatment of the parties can risk the finality of the award 
rendered. If a tribunal were to apply different rules of privilege to the parties or simply 
disregard a privilege claim with an arbitrary decision this might constitute a breach of due 
process requirements. However, this would require proof that the tribunal failed to 
consider applicable privilege rules which resulted in unfairness to a party such that it 
affected the award.88 Meeting such a standard in reality can prove to be quite hard. 
Second, the finality of an arbitral award may in some cases be tested on public policy 
grounds. An award could be set aside by a court of the place of arbitration89 or its 
enforcement could be denied by the court from which enforcement is sought90, if the 
                                                          
83 The article provides that “Recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award, irrespective of the 
country in which it was made, may be refused only…at the request of the party against whom it is 
invoked, if that party furnishes to the competent court where recognition or enforcement is 
sought proof that…the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of 
the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to 
present his case…”. 
84 The article follows the wording of article V( 1)(b) of the New York Convention. The United 
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards dating from 
1958 is commonly referred to as “the New York Convention”. It is a widely acknowledged and 
fundamental element of international arbitration as it has been significant in bettering the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards by jurisdictions around the world. 
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23 
 
award is found to be contradictory to the public policy of the court’s own country. Every 
country of course defines its own public policy but on a general level it can be said that 
public policy refers to such fundamental legal principles or fundamental notions of justice 
which a national court is necessarily bound by.91 The question remains whether legal 
privilege can be considered such that it could form part of a country’s public policy. If this 
is the case, awards rendered in breach of a party’s right to legal privilege could constitute 
grounds for the setting aside of the award or the refusal to recognize or enforce it.  
However, courts are apparently increasingly reluctant to dismiss the finality of an arbitral 
award on grounds of public policy.92 With regard to the enforcement of arbitral awards, 
most countries follow the “pro-enforcement bias” of the New York Convention whereby it 
is more of a rare exception for enforcement to be denied on the basis of public policy.93 
The few exceptions mentioned seem to deal with cases that involve a criminal element94; 
a precondition which is not easily applicable to matters regarding legal privilege.95 
In the end, the manner in which an arbitrator deals with privilege claims in arbitral 
proceedings can be a question of whether or not he succeeds to render a final award. By 
approaching privilege claims with due consideration, especially with party equality in 
mind, an arbitrator is likely to be on the safe side and not face any challenges of the award 
or refusal to recognize or enforce it by national courts. Rendering a final award is the goal 
of every arbitrator whereby arbitrators should avoid any conduct which has the potential 
of causing the setting aside of an award or impeding its enforcement. 
2.3. Towards a choice of law 
Disputes on legal privilege are in essence a matter of choice of law. In international 
arbitration, choice of law is a common challenge to arbitrators who can be faced with a 
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94 ibid. 
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variety of potentially applicable laws from which to choose, for example, with regards to 
the law applied to the subject matter of the dispute. Knowledge of which rules and 
standards are applied is crucial to any arbitration and such questions must naturally be 
solved before any solutions on the dispute itself can be reached.96 As with most matters in 
international arbitration, choice of law is first a question of what the parties have agreed 
on; if an agreement on an applicable law exists, the problem of applicable law is generally 
solved. This is also the case with legal privilege in international arbitration but as will be 
discussed further in following sections, parties to arbitration rarely agree on which law is 
applied to legal privilege. 
Lacking an agreement on the applicable law, arbitrators use their discretion to determine 
the applicable rule either with the help of conflict of laws rules or by applying rules they 
consider appropriate.97 As an agent of the parties who enjoys a delegated authority the 
arbitrator must, however, respect parties’ expectations and seek to fulfill their intentions 
in this task because the power to make the choice originates itself from party autonomy.98 
The arbitrator’s mandate is based on the agreement by the parties; a fact, which renders 
it inappropriate to prioritize the interests of any state in the conflict of laws analysis. 
Instead, the arbitrator should analyze the applicability of any and all rules with a 
connection to the dispute and not just the law of the seat, for instance.99 
The general principles regarding choice of law in international arbitration form the basis 
for any choice of law decision regarding legal privilege as well. In practice, a choice 
regarding a law of legal privilege can be quite challenging as complex cases can have 
numerous potentially applicable laws of legal privilege if parties, tribunals, attorneys and 
the communications sought to be protected are all connected with different jurisdictions. 
As an example, consider the following situation which has been used in some form by 
many commentators: 
“To illustrate the scope of the problem and the issues at stake, imagine a 
multinational technology consulting company headquartered in New York, 
represented by U.S. counsel, and a Swiss investment banking firm, 
represented by German counsel. The parties enter into a contract under which 
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the multinational will develop and install a new trading system for the bank. 
The contract includes an arbitration clause specifying that any disputes 
relating to the contract will be arbitrated in Paris under the auspices of the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The arbitration clause specifies 
that English law will govern. The Swiss firm decides to pull out of the contract 
after half of the work has been completed. The multinational requests 
arbitration and asks a French law firm to handle the representation. The Swiss 
firm hires English counsel to represent it.”100 
When parties to a case like the one above seek evidence from another jurisdiction, the 
tribunal is faced with an issue of cross-jurisdictional privilege and must thus determine 
which law applies to a claim of privilege.101  
With regards to legal privilege in international arbitration, there are a number of 
potentially applicable laws and while some commentators have made a list of nearly a 
dozen alternatives, others refer to a somewhat briefer list. According to Mosk & Ginsburg 
a claim of privilege can be based on: (i) the law of the forum, (ii) the law of the domicile or 
residence of a party, (iii) the law most closely connected with the communication or 
document, or perhaps (iv) international law or general principles of law.102  
With reference to the obligation of United States federal courts to apply state privilege 
law in diversity cases, Berger presents a list which, in addition to those mentioned above, 
includes: (v) the law of the state in which the underlying cause of action arose, and (vi) 
the law of the state of the attorney’s practice.103  
Furthermore, some authors have suggested the following alternatives: (vii) the procedural 
law of the arbitration, (viii) the law governing the arbitration agreement, (ix) the law of 
the forum where enforcement of the disclosure order is sought104, (x) the law of the place 
where evidence is located, and (xi) the law of the place where the document was sent.105 
There is a variety of laws which could apply to legal privilege in international arbitral 
proceedings but by using conflict of laws rules and relevant theories arbitrators can 
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narrow down the alternatives and find the law most suited for any case at issue.106 This 
section will first discuss the likelihood of parties agreeing on a law of legal privilege and 
then take a look at difficulties regarding qualification of privileges as substantive or 
procedural. Finally, the possibilities of an arbitrator to make a choice of law without 
referring to strict choice of law rules will be explored.  
2.3.1. Party agreement 
An obvious way to stop legal privilege becoming an issue in international arbitration 
would be the inclusion of a related provision into the arbitration agreement or arbitration 
clause. As always, the problem with trying to include all possible scenarios into an 
arbitration clause is that arbitration clauses do not always enjoy too much attention 
during negotiations concentrating on the main agreement. This “midnight clause” nature 
of arbitration clauses is well known in commentaries as such clauses are commonly dealt 
with quite quickly and only after negotiating the main contract.107 After all, out of all the 
matters left unmentioned in basic arbitration clauses, it is quite unlikely for legal privilege 
to become the first deserving extra attention. This is understandable as legal privilege is a 
rather specific area of interest and parties might often be unwilling to pay attention to 
arbitration clauses at all, let alone to such “small” details on procedure and evidence as 
legal privilege. Most likely contracting parties are not even aware of the benefits or 
downsides their domestic legislation could provide in relation to other contracting parties 
with regards to confidential communications between them and their lawyers. Also, 
parties can very well be unwilling to negotiate the somewhat negative and seemingly 
irrelevant issue of a hypothetical dispute taking place somewhere in an undesirable 
future.108  
It is sometimes up to an assisting lawyer to take a look at arbitration clauses, so it is 
arguably such professionals, if anyone, who will take privilege matters into consideration 
in the drafting of the clause. However, even with a lawyer aware of potential problems, it 
could still be rather challenging to reach an agreement between parties, first of all, on the 
necessity to spend time and effort on negotiating privilege matters, and second, on the 
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question of which party is to “drop” their domestic rules of privilege and instead apply 
some other set of rules even if on a mutual basis. After all, this would likely be the 
conclusion in reality if parties were to resolve privilege matters once and for all already in 
the arbitration clause. It is easy to imagine that making such a choice, which can have 
profound practical implications as it involves all internal and external communications 
relating to legal advice from date of agreement to potential dispute somewhere far away 
in the future, can seem impossible for any corporate party wishing to continue business as 
usual without unnecessary hindrances. Further, such an agreement on the application of 
foreign rules of privilege could well prove impossible in practice for a party who is perhaps 
bound to a set of rules on the basis of its place of business or some other factor.109  
Of course parties can agree on privileges also after the dispute has arisen. This can, 
however, prove challenging in reality as a party might often reject suggestions made by 
the other party either due to the fact that the suggestion is clearly beneficial to the party 
making it or because a party is hesitant to trust the candidness of such a suggestion even 
when no bias is visible.110 When a dispute is on, parties are often already digging their 
trenches and thus reluctant to admit the existence of potential benefits in reaching an 
agreement on an unsettled issue, such as legal privilege. 
To find a solution to privilege problems by forcing parties to agree on the matter may 
seem farfetched. Yet, it could be helpful to start discussions on the matter early on in the 
proceedings and search for some consensus in a pre-emptive manner. Even if such 
discussions would not lead to a clear agreement on the matter between the parties, this 
approach would likely provide the arbitrator with some insight on the parties’ 
expectations regarding legal privilege and its significance to them. 
2.3.2. Difficulty of qualifying legal privilege 
Failing party agreement on the matter, an arbitrator will have to determine which law is 
applicable to legal privileges. The first step in a conflict of laws approach to legal privilege 
is for the tribunal to decide whether legal privilege in arbitration is in fact a matter of 
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procedural law or a matter of substantive law, although quite often the question is 
dismissed by stating that they are in fact a matter of both laws.111 
Legal privilege is often described as being both procedural and substantive in nature, 
which is partly explained by the fact that even though legal privilege deals with 
substantive rights, it is often manifested in procedural codes causing an indication of it 
being procedural in nature.112 In addition to being situated in procedural codes, legal 
privilege has in practice a procedural function as it is used to limit the possibilities of 
establishing the truth and to block discovery or disclosure under common law.113 A view 
that legal privilege is both procedural and substantive in nature is further supported by 
the fact that national courts have not been able to reach a consensus on the matter, 
either.114 Still, from a conflict of laws perspective the qualification of legal privilege as 
either procedural or substantive may prove important as different outcomes can point the 
arbitrator to different directions.115 
The question of procedural or substantive is again a matter with cultural variations as 
courts in the United States often hold that privileges are substantive in nature whereas in 
civil law jurisdictions privileges are often considered procedural in nature.116 In England 
privileges have traditionally been regarded as part of rules of evidence and therefore of 
procedural character, although recent case law has presented privilege as a fundamental 
substantive right.117  
A procedural approach has traditionally been connected with some problems. Some 
commentators point out that a procedural approach can prove problematic already in 
international litigation. 118  A procedural classification can be seen problematic in 
international litigation where it leads to the application of lex fori even in cases where the 
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connection between the place of the tribunal and the facts of the case is very weak.119 In 
these cases problems relate to the predictability of the proceedings and to the 
compatibility of domestic rules with disputes of international character.120 However, an 
arbitral tribunal does not have a lex fori and therefore the abovementioned does not 
apply to international arbitration. 121  In fact, it is a widely acknowledged fact in 
international arbitration that parties do not have domestic procedural laws in mind when 
they choose the seat of arbitration.122 Parties seldom expect the application of the 
procedural rules of the country where the arbitral proceedings are held, whereby it would 
be “highly unsatisfactory” if they would be applied to evidentiary privileges, especially 
when communications protected by such privileges have often taken place a long time 
ago in a totally different jurisdiction.123 
In practice, if legal privilege is considered procedural in nature, the law applicable to 
arbitral procedure is used to solve any question relating to it. Under the territorial 
principle adopted in most modern arbitration acts, this would mean the application of lex 
loci arbitri, in other words the law of the seat of the arbitral tribunal.124 Some could find 
such a procedural approach beneficial due to its simplicity and clearness as one law would 
be applied to all claims of privilege regardless of which party made the claim.125 But 
applying lex arbitri to legal privileges would not take into account the substantive aspects 
of legal privileges.126 In addition, national arbitration acts do not usually include any 
mention of privileges.127 As most national arbitration acts present arbitrators with a broad 
discretion to resolve procedural matters, this would likely be the solution to any problem 
regarding legal privilege as well. This leads to the conclusion that arbitrators’ discretion 
becomes paramount in the resolution of privilege matters.128   
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If legal privileges are considered substantial in nature and the contractual relationship of 
the parties thus becomes central, problems arise first of all as parties rarely include a 
choice of a law of legal privilege the arbitration agreement.129 Failing party agreement on 
privileges, the arbitral tribunal could refer to the law applicable to the main contract but 
such a law would typically not be intended as an agreement on privilege issues.130 
Applying the conflict of laws rules set under the contractual law is a possible solution to 
the problem. However, applying such rules might be problematic in constraining the 
arbitrator more than if he were to choose a law under procedural discretion, because lex 
arbitri provisions dealing with choice of substantive law may require a conflicts 
methodology.131 
Some authors nevertheless recommend a substantive approach due to parties’ legitimate 
expectations because qualifying privileges as procedural has a high potential of leading to 
failure of such expectations. Thus, some believe that arbitrators “will almost certainly” 
come to the conclusion that legal privilege has a substantive nature.132 A substantive 
qualification is first of all justified by the fact that legal privileges can undoubtedly be seen 
as rules of law which affect individuals’, lawyers’ and clients’ conduct already outside any 
procedural setting, for instance when the establishment of a relationship is first 
contemplated.133 This view is further justified by the public policy nature of privileges, i.e. 
the highly valued and well-established judgment that lawyer-client communications need 
to be protected in a functioning judicial system. Thus the public policy judgments which 
justify the existence of legal privilege are inherently substantive in nature, whereby legal 
privilege itself is in fact substantive regardless of the substantive or procedural nature of 
the rules where they are manifested.134 Through this approach it is possible to avoid 
problems which might stem from cultural variations: 
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“Focusing on the value of the relevant information or communication allows a 
substantive qualification irrespective of whether the privilege is a right of the 
client, as in common law, or a right of the attorney, as in civil law.”135 
The pros and cons of both the procedural and substantive approach give the impression 
that qualifying legal privilege as one or the other might not always be simple in practice. 
Indeed, it is true that legal privilege does not fit neatly into either category.136 
Nevertheless, clarity results in predictability, which again will more likely lead to parties 
being content with the tribunal’s findings. In an attempt to clarify the matter of qualifying 
privileges in international arbitration, several authors have issued a comparative or 
cumulative approach137 to qualifying privileges and ended up with different results as to 
which result would be most justified.138 In practice, the comparative approach, or 
“cumulative application”139 is helpful because it takes into consideration the dual nature 
of legal privilege as being based on several laws, and then tests the applicability of these 
laws, for instance, the law of the arbitration and the law most closely connected with the 
evidence.140  
Such a value based approach to the qualification of legal privilege might seem reasonable 
and could provide for some clarity for tribunals and parties who are trying to resolve this 
preliminary stage of any choice of law problem. However, legal privilege is commonly 
regarded both procedural and substantive in nature whereby a qualification as either or 
might not be simple. Ultimately, the significance of traditional qualification as a 
preliminary phase of a choice of law solution is perhaps less important in international 
arbitration where arbitrators sometimes have more direct means at their disposal as well. 
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Kohler & Bärtsch to a “cumulative approach”, all describing more or less the same thing. 
138 For instance, Berger argues strongly for a substantive approach, e.g. at. p. 507-509.  
139 Kaufmann-Kohler & Bärtsch, p. 19. 
140 ibid. 
32 
 
2.3.3. Possibilities of making a direct choice of law 
Even though the use of traditional conflicts of law rules may prove helpful also in 
connection with matters of legal privilege in international arbitration, application of such 
rules is not necessarily obligatory in international arbitration. Therefore, it is important to 
avoid depicting strict application of conflict of laws rules as the only possible solution to 
privilege disputes. Indeed, some commentators argue that the question whether an 
arbitrator should use conflict of laws rules or not may be academic, since “in practice an 
arbitral tribunal will seek to apply the law (or if permitted, the rules of law) which it 
considers to be appropriate”.141 
Traditionally, commentators have considered that international arbitral tribunals can 
determine applicable laws in two ways; either indirectly, applying conflict of laws rules, or 
directly, applying the law they consider most appropriate.142 Some argue that traditional 
conflict of laws rules have become comparatively irrelevant due to the widely applied 
delocalization principle, according to which arbitral tribunals are not considered bound by 
the procedural provisions or conflict of laws rules of the seat and therefore enjoy broad 
discretion in deciding which conflict of laws rules to apply, if any.143 
Arbitrators enjoy a certain freedom in choice of law matters. This freedom is emphasized 
by the voie directe principle or direct choice method144, which allows the tribunal to apply 
such rules which it “considers appropriate”145. It is a principle included, for example, in 
Article 17(1) of the ICC Rules146 which provides that in the absence of party agreement, 
“the Arbitral Tribunal shall apply the rules of law which it determines to be appropriate”, 
and it is also seen in the provisions on privilege in the IBA Rules  and the ICDR Rules147 
which allow the arbitrator to apply any rules which it considers appropriate.148 With voie 
                                                          
141 Redfern, Hunter et al., p. 235. 
142 Lew, Mistelis et al. p. 428. 
143 Heiskanen, p. 450-451. 
144 Gaillard & Savage, p. 876. 
145 ibid. 
146 The International Chamber of Commerce’s Arbitration Rules 2012 will be discussed in more 
detail in section 2.4.2. below. 
147 The International Center for Dispute Resolution (ICDR) is a part of the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA). 
148 See section 2.4.2. below. As another example, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
Arbitration Rules (“SCC Rules”) state in Article 22 that failing an agreement of the parties on 
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directe any choice of law questions are left to the discretion of the arbitrator who is thus 
provided with a practical possibility to choose a law without necessarily referring to any 
particular choice of law rule.149 
According to some commentators, growing application of voie directe has caused a 
displacement of the rule-based approach in favor of a more “interest-based” approach to 
conflict of laws issues as a result of a “relative decline” in importance of the classic conflict 
of laws rules in international arbitration. 150 Where no one set of conflict of law binds the 
arbitrator, he in fact has to choose between laws chosen directly or indirectly by the 
parties and any other laws that may be applicable, instead of choosing between domestic 
and foreign laws in the classical sense of choice of law related with litigation.151 
One issue with voie directe is the question of what is meant with “appropriate”? 
Commentators have presented different characteristics as to what could make a certain 
rule, law or standard appropriate in a given situation. For instance, the close connection 
between a set of rules and a dispute can understandably make application of the rules 
appropriate. However, voie directe presents a tribunal with broader powers of discretion 
as well; for example, an applied system can be appropriate because it is “highly developed 
and sophisticated and suitable for the contract or dispute in question”152, even when 
lacking a closer connection with them. This raises the interesting question of how broad 
the tribunal’s discretion is in privilege disputes when contemplating the appropriateness 
of potentially applicable rules. 
On the issue of choosing the applicable substantive law, some commentators have named 
voie directe an inappropriate response even if frustrations with traditional choice of law 
rules would be understandable.153  Such critique is based on the view that, when 
traditional conflict of laws rules are used parties are provided with certainty, and that 
such rules channel and structure the decision-maker’s discretion. Predictability and 
                                                                                                                                                                                
applicable law or rules of law, the tribunal shall apply the rules or rules of law “which it considers 
to be most appropriate”.  
149 Gaillard & Savage, p. 876. 
150 Heiskanen, p. 450. 
151 Heiskanen therefore describes conflict of laws in international arbitration as ”transnational”, 
see Heiskanen at p. 451. 
152 Lew, Mistelis et al., p. 435. 
153 Born, p. 2136. 
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fairness could be at stake with voie directe when parties’ substantive rights might be left 
“to turn on subjective, unarticulated instincts of individual arbitrators”154. Although not 
aimed at the choice of privilege law as such, this critique does serve well in provoking the 
downsides of a voie directe, which should be kept in mind also when searching the correct 
method for resolving privilege disputes. 
Those few rules which do mention legal privilege provide the arbitrator with the power to 
apply rules which it considers appropriate. An arbitrator is likely to work towards a 
practical solution but depending on the case at issue, reference to conflict of laws rules 
may be seen to enhance predictability, especially if the rules support a result which the 
arbitrator is working towards in any case. 
2.4. Legal privilege in arbitration rules and legislation 
Most national arbitration acts and institutional arbitration rules provide very little 
guidance on which law to apply in resolving disputes concerning legal privilege. This 
section will focus on the most relevant sources in international arbitration and examine 
how questions relating to privileges are handled in laws, rules and other relevant sources. 
The analysis will concentrate on national arbitration acts, model laws, institutional and 
other arbitration rules, international conventions and guidelines as well as international 
law and public policy. 
2.4.1. National arbitration acts and model laws 
Already the production of evidence in general is mentioned only briefly in most national 
arbitration acts and evidentiary privileges are generally paid even less attention. If 
privileges are mentioned at all, it is within a provision providing arbitrators with a broad 
discretion with regards to the conduct of the proceedings and the taking of evidence, as 
will be seen in this section. Apparently no national arbitration act goes further in guiding 
the choice of a law of legal privilege than a statement admitting that it is in the 
arbitrator's discretion to choose applicable laws on legal privilege. 
For example, the English Arbitration Act of 1996 provides in statute 34 that it "shall be for 
the tribunal to decide all procedural and evidential matters, subject to the right of the 
                                                          
154 Born, p. 2137. 
35 
 
parties to agree any matter", and further, that such matters include "whether to apply 
strict rule of evidence (or any other rules) as to the admissibility, relevance and weight of 
any material (oral, written or other) sought to be tendered".155 No direct mention of legal 
privilege exists in the act, but rather a statement of the arbitrator's discretionary powers 
regarding procedural matters and a possibility of applying stricter evidentiary and 
procedural rules, for instance on privileges. 
Similarly, the arbitration acts of Nordic countries include no mention of legal privilege.156 
They usually present the parties with an obligation to provide relevant evidence and 
reserve the tribunal with a right to "refuse evidence if it is obviously irrelevant to the 
determination of the case". 157  Although legal privilege is not mentioned directly, 
arbitrators working under the auspices of a Nordic arbitration act should still take legal 
privilege claims into consideration due to their obligation to afford the parties a sufficient 
opportunity to present their case and to handle the parties and proceedings in an 
impartial and practical manner.158 
Also the French Arbitration Act presents the arbitrator with a power to define the 
procedure to be followed in the arbitration, if the parties have not agreed otherwise.159 
With regards to evidentiary matters, the tribunal shall take all necessary steps concerning 
such matters and in cases where a party is in possession of an item of evidence, "the 
arbitral tribunal may enjoin that party to produce it".160 Arbitrators are provided with 
powers to decide on procedural rules and request evidence from parties, and even with 
powers to attach penalties in case of non-compliance161, but legal privilege is left 
unmentioned. 
                                                          
155 Arbitration Act 1996. 
156 For instance, the Finnish Arbitration Act provides that the tribunal is required to “give the 
parties a sufficient opportunity to present their case” according to Section 21 and to “promote an 
appropriate and speedy settlement of the matter” as well as issue document request according to 
Section 27. However, no direct mention of privileges or even evaluation of admissibility of 
evidence is included. 
157 See Section 28 of Norwegian Arbitration Act of 14 May 2004, Section 25 of the Swedish 
Arbitration Act or Section 26 of the Finnish Arbitration Act. 
158 See, for instance, Sections 21 and 24 of the Swedish Arbitration Act. The link between party 
equality and legal privilege will be discussed further in following sections. 
159 Article 1464, French Arbitration Act, Decree No. 2011-48 of 13 January 2011. 
160 Article 1467, French Arbitration Act. 
161 ibid. 
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The UNCITRAL Model Law enjoys widespread recognition as a basis for efforts to reform 
or modernize national arbitration acts. Thus it has a well-established status in 
international arbitration but its provisions on privilege are just as limited as those of most 
national acts with Article 19(2) providing the tribunal “the power to determine the 
admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence”. This is of course 
understandable against the background of it being a transnational legal instrument with a 
wide constituency.162 
2.4.2. Institutional arbitration rules and the IBA Rules 
The majority of institutional arbitration rules are similarly silent on evidentiary privileges 
and related choice of law questions. Instead, they tend to leave any decision on privileges 
along with the conduct of the evidentiary proceedings in general to the arbitrator’s 
discretion. The discretionary power to deal with privileges is usually based on a provision 
which more or less allows the arbitrator to determine the admissibility, relevance and 
probative value of evidence. For example, article 27 (4) of the UNICTRAL Arbitration 
Rules163 provides as follows: 
“The arbitral tribunal shall determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality 
and weight of the evidence offered”.164 
Other arbitration rules such as the WIPO165, ICSID166 and Swiss Rules167 have taken a 
similar approach to evidence and arbitrator’s discretion in deciding matters related with 
it. 
According to the ICC Rules168, the proceedings can be governed by “any rules” which the 
arbitral tribunal “may settle on”. Also, the tribunal "may take measures for protecting 
                                                          
162 Tevendale & Cartwright-Finch, p. 826. 
163 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as revised in 2010. 
164 A similar provision is found, for example, in the SCC Rules in Article 26 (1): ”The admissibility, 
relevance, materiality and weight of evidence shall be for the Arbitral Tribunal to determine”. See 
also Article 33.1 of the Arbitration Rules of the Finnish Chamber of Commerce’s Arbitration 
Institute 2013 (“FCC Rules”). 
165 See Article 48 (a) of World Intellectual Property Organization Arbitration Rules. 
166 See Rule 34 (1) of the Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) applied 
under ICSID (the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States). 
167 See Article 24 (2) of the Swiss Chambers’ Arbitration Institution’s Swiss Rules of International 
Arbitration. 
168 See Article 19 of the ICC Rules. 
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trade secrets and confidential information"169, but this is understood as a reference to 
commercial confidence and not legal privilege.170  
The LCIA171 rules have a somewhat more in-depth provision on evidence which accords 
the arbitrator with the power “to decide whether or not to apply any strict rules of 
evidence (or any other rules) as to the admissibility, relevance or weight of any material 
tendered by a party on any matter of fact or expert opinion” but still no mention of 
privileges is included; it is up to the arbitrator to decide how to deal with legal privilege.  
Some exceptions do exist, though. To begin with, statute 20.6. of the ICDR Rules provides 
that the tribunal "shall take into account applicable principles of legal privilege, such as 
those involving the confidentiality of communications between a lawyer and client". The 
rules require the tribunal to follow applicable principles of privilege, but leave it to the 
arbitrator to choose within his discretion which principles to apply in practice. 
The IBA Rules172 provide clearest reference to legal privilege. According to Article 9.2(b) of 
the IBA Rules, the tribunal can "exclude from evidence or production any document, 
statement, oral testimony or inspection" due to "legal impediment or privilege under the 
legal or ethical rules determined by the arbitral tribunal to be applicable" (emphasis 
added). According to the commentary of the revised text173, Article 9.2(b) "provides 
protection for documents and other evidence that may be covered by certain privileges, 
                                                          
169 See Article 22(3) of the ICC Rules. 
170 See Tevendale & Cartwright-Finch at p. 826. Further, commentaries on the ICC Rules, such as 
Grierson & van Hooft, refer to the IBA Rules for guidance on legal privilege. See Grierson & van 
Hooft at p. 179-180. 
171 See Article 22.1 (f) of the London Court of International Arbitration’s Arbitration Rules. 
172 See Grierson & van Hooft at p. 175 on the role of the IBA Rules in modern international arbitral 
proceedings. First of all, the rules are not binding “unless the parties to the arbitration so agree, or 
the arbitral tribunal determines, that they should be.” Further, the rules have become “a standard 
reference for parties making or responding to document requests, and for arbitral tribunals 
deciding whether to order document production”. Finally, according to Grierson & van Hooft, “it is 
highly unusual for them not to be referred to in relation to a document request”. Also, Tevendale 
& Cartwright-Finch state at p. 827 that the IBA Rules are applied “very widely…throughout the 
world” and upon subsequent review are sometimes found to have had the effects of a mandatory 
provision, even though they are “infrequently accepted as being of mandatory application”. 
Redfern, Hunter et al., at p 393, describe the rules, with reference to the previous version of 1999, 
as having “become almost universally recognised as the international standard for an effective, 
pragmatic, and relatively economical document production regime”. 
173 Commentary on the revised text of the 2010 IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in 
International Arbitration by the 1999 IBA Working Party & 2010 IBA Rules of Evidence Review 
Subcommittee ("IBA Rules Commentary"). The IBA rules were revised and a new version published 
in 2010, whereas the earlier version dated back to 1999. 
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under the appropriate applicable law, such as the attorney-client privilege, professional 
secrecy or the without prejudice privilege".174 Further, "[t]he Working Party felt that it was 
important that such privileges be recognized in international arbitration"175. Raeschke-
Kessler, who was a member of the working party responsible for the drafting of the IBA 
Rules both in 1999 and 2010, has commented on Article 9.2(b) as follows: 
“Article 9, section 2(b) contains the objection of ‘legal impediment or 
privilege’, which is especially important for Anglo-American in-house counsel. 
In common law countries the internal legal report of an in-house counsel to 
the management is not available to the other party by a discovery procedure. 
As far as a witness has the right to refuse to give evidence, documents related 
to that witness must also not be produced during discovery. For any Anglo-
American lawyer engaged in an international arbitration and accustomed to 
discovery, the objection of legal privilege is an important defence in arbitral 
proceedings.”176 
Based on the IBA Rules Commentary and the above remarks from one of the drafters it is 
clear that the IBA Rules were drafted with some of the most common privilege related 
problems in mind but that arbitrator’s discretion was seen as the best approach when 
determining which rules should be applied on privilege in practice.  
When the tribunal has determined the rules applicable to privilege matters, further 
guidance to the application of Article 9.2(b) of the IBA Rules is provided in Article 9.3, 
which presents as follows: 
“In considering issues of legal impediment or privilege under Article 9.2(b), 
and insofar as permitted by any mandatory legal or ethical rules that are 
determine by it to be applicable, the Arbitral Tribunal may take into account…” 
Article 9.3 was not included in the 1999 version of the IBA Rules177 and it has been 
described as a “major improvement in the area of privileges” when compared with the 
                                                          
174 IBA 2010 Rules Commentary, p.25. 
175 ibid. 
176 Raeschke-Kessler, at p. 427, comments on Article 9.2(b) of the IBA rules from 1999 but as the 
wording of the article has remained the same, the commentary remains relevant. 
177 With the earlier version of the IBA Rules, privilege disputes could mainly be addressed with the 
“catch-all” provision in Article 9.2(g), the wording of which is still very much the same in the 2010 
rules. It provides that the tribunal can exclude from evidence or production any document due to 
“considerations of procedural economy, proportionality, fairness or equality of the parties that the 
[tribunal] determines to be compelling”. The IBA Rules Commentary mentions as an example at p. 
26 a situation where “documents that might be considered to be privileged within one national 
legal system may not be considered to be privileged within another”. In cases where this situation 
would create unfairness “the arbitral tribunal may exclude production of the technically non-
privileged documents pursuant to this provision”. 
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earlier version of the rules.178 According to the IBA Rules Commentary, Article 9.3 is meant 
as “additional non-binding guidance”, but as presented below, the article addresses the 
most important concerns related with legal privilege in international arbitration.179  
According to Article 9.3(a), the tribunal can take into account any need to protect the 
confidentiality of documents or communications made in connection with and for the 
purpose of providing or obtaining legal advice. This provision is thus an indication of the 
need to take legal privilege into consideration, and according to the commentary, it seeks 
to encompass both civil and common law approaches to legal privilege.180  
Article 9.3(c) recognizes the possible need to take into account parties’, and their 
advisors’, expectations at the time the privilege is said to have arisen. Thus the IBA Rules 
recognize how the parties’ reliance on privileges should not be disregarded in 
international arbitration.181  
Article 9.3(d) provides that the tribunal may take into account any possible waiver of any 
applicable legal impediment or privilege by virtue of consent, earlier disclosure, 
affirmative use of the document, statement, oral communication or advice contained 
therein, or otherwise.  
Finally, via Article 9.3(e) the tribunal may take into account the need to maintain fairness 
and equality as between the parties, particularly if they are subject to different legal or 
ethical rules. 
The IBA Rules thus clearly recognize the most relevant issues relating to legal privilege and 
emphasize the ultimate importance of bearing in mind principles of equality and fairness 
in the application of any rules of legal privilege in international arbitration. Particular 
emphasis is given to the scenario where different rules apply to the parties, which is 
indeed at the core of any privilege dispute in international arbitration. According to the 
commentary, applying different rules to different parties, for instance in cases where 
settlement privilege is not recognized or in-house communications are not protected by 
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both rules, could “create unfairness by shielding the documents of one party from 
production but not those of the other”.182 
As is apparent from that presented above, the IBA Rules provide the most extensive 
guidelines on legal privilege in international arbitration. Institutional arbitration rules, on 
the other hand, tend to treat legal privilege as most other procedural details, so that party 
agreement and arbitrator’s discretion are key in determining an approach to it. 
2.4.3. International conventions 
As national arbitration acts and institutional rules are often silent on legal privilege, 
international conventions have been used as guidance in the search for an approach to 
legal privilege also in international arbitration.183 Due to their well-established status in 
the global legal environment, arbitrators and parties alike may find them useful when 
trying to determine an approach to any choice of law problem regarding legal privilege. 
One such convention is the 1970 Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in 
Civil and Commercial Matters (hereinafter: “the Hague Convention”) and more specifically 
Article 11 of said convention, which provides with regards to privileges as follows: 
“In the execution of a Letter of Request the person concerned may refuse to 
give evidence in so far as he has a privilege or duty to refuse to give the 
evidence 
(a) under the law of the State of execution; or 
(b) under the law of the State of origin, and a privilege or duty has been 
specified in the Letter, or, at the instance of the requested authority, has 
been otherwise confirmed to that authority by the requesting authority. 
A Contracting State may declare that, in addition, it will respect privileges and 
duties existing under the law of States other than the State of origin and the 
State of execution, to the extent specified in that declaration.” 
More recently, a similar provision was included into EC Regulation 1206/2001 on 
cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil 
and commercial matters. Article 14 of the regulation is titled “Refusal to execute” and its 
first paragraph reads as follows: 
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183 See e.g. Alvarez at p. 682 or Heitzmann at p. 220-222. 
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“A request for the hearing of a person shall not be executed when the person 
concerned claims the right to refuse to give evidence or to be prohibited from 
giving evidence, 
(a) under the law of the Member State of the requested court; or 
(b) under the law of the Member State of the requesting court, and such right 
has been  specified in the request, or, if need be, at the instance of the 
requested court, has been confirmed by the requesting court.” 
According to Heitzmann, this regulation can develop into two situations. Either a privilege 
under the law of the requested court can allow a refusal or there exists a privilege under 
the law of the requesting court allowing a refusal to communicate evidence.184 In the 
latter case, a right to such a privilege has to be specified in the request or it needs to be 
confirmed by the requesting court if the person relies on its existence and the requested 
court seeks confirmation of its existence as a result. 
In addition, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court includes provisions on 
the protection of privilege in Article 69(5) of the Statute, according to which “[t]he Court 
shall respect and observe privileges on confidentiality as provided for in the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence”.185 
The international conventions mentioned here are not directly applicable in international 
arbitration but they do serve as an indication of the fact that the importance of legal 
privilege and the necessity to respect it accordingly has been recognized on an 
international level, a fact which arbitrators should bear in mind as well. Further, as the 
most conventional sources of international arbitration are somewhat silent on the matter, 
practitioners may find it appropriate to search guidance from well-recognized conventions 
used in international litigation.  
2.4.4. Other transnational and international sources 
Many commentators 186  refer to the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil 
Procedure (hereinafter the "ALI/UNIDROIT Principles") 187  as a source of potential 
                                                          
184 Heitzmann, p. 222. 
185 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, entered into force 1 July 2002. 
186 See, for instance, Alvarez at p. 681 and von Schlabrendorff & Sheppard at p. 760-761. 
187 The principles were prepared jointly by the American Law Institute and a UNIDROIT Study 
Group and adopted in 2004 by the Governing Council of UNIDROIT (UNIDROIT refers to the 
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law). Their aim is to reconcile differences 
among national rules of civil procedure, taking into account the special character of transnational 
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guidance also for parties and arbitrators in international arbitration. According to Principle 
18.1 of the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles effect "should be given to privileges, immunities, and 
similar protections of a party or nonparty concerning disclosure of evidence or other 
information". More precisely, Principle 18.2 provides that a court "should consider 
whether these protections may justify a party's failure to disclose evidence" when 
contemplating adverse inferences. The commentary section following the principles 
points out that all legal systems recognize various privileges and share the view of their 
importance, but admit that the basis and potential consequences of them differ.188 Some 
commentators, while referring to the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles, have pointed out that 
disregarding privilege while ordering the production of privileged documents is simply not 
right as a matter of principle.189 
Some authors also refer to the Code of Conduct for European Lawyers which was 
produced by the Council of the Bar and Law Societies of the European Union, also known 
as CCBE (“the CCBE Code of Conduct”).190 As a soft law instrument aimed at European 
lawyers and thus not applicable globally191, the CCBE Code of Conduct can be used in 
international arbitration mainly as practical advice to lawyers wishing to secure the 
admissibility of documents. According to Article 5.3.1 of the CCBE Code of Conduct, which 
is titled Correspondence Between Lawyers, lawyers communicating between Member 
States should “clearly express” their intention of keeping communications confidential 
when sending such communications between Member States. More importantly, 
according to the following article the receiving party should return the communication to 
                                                                                                                                                                                
disputes. According to UNIDROIT's website, they may also be applied by analogy in international 
commercial arbitration. The ALI/UNIDROIT Principles are available in Uniform Law Review 2004-4 
at pp. 758-808. 
188 Uniform Law Review 2004-4 at p. 792. 
189 Heitzmann, p.218. He argues that the importance of following ethical principles therefore 
becomes a core reason for respecting privileges. 
190 The CCBE Code of Conduct was first adopted on 28 October 1988 and amended last on 19 May 
2006 and it is binding on all member states. More recently, the CCBE adopted on 24 November 
2006 a Charter of Core Principles of the European Legal Profession.  
191 Berger, p. 513. See also Rubinstein & Guerrina at p. 599-600 for more on CCBE's Code of 
Conduct; they describe it to reflect, to some degree, a civil law approach to privilege because 
confidentiality is addressed in the context of a lawyer’s professional ethics and responsibilities. 
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the sender without disclosing it to others, if receiving party is “unable to ensure its status 
as confidential or without prejudice”.192  
Thus, the rules emphasize the importance of pre-emptive measures in protecting 
communications, so that parties to communication always assure beforehand that 
confidentiality of communications can be maintained in the long run. Notwithstanding the 
scope of application of the CCBE Code of Conduct, maintaining a pre-emptive approach to 
legal privilege would certainly relieve parties to arbitration of some surprises. 
2.4.5. International law and public policy 
Some commentators have suggested that arbitrators could turn to international law and 
international public policy for help when dealing with legal privilege.193 Certainly, the 
following considerations at least strengthen the perceived importance of protecting legal 
privilege even if it would not be considered a matter of public policy as such.194 
In public international law, general principles of law form one of the sources specified in 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.195 Although authorities are 
undecided on the scope, content and methods of finding general principles of law, they 
have agreed on many such principles, which are used regularly by courts and tribunals.196 
The idea of legal privilege as a general principle of law is controversial but the widespread 
use of some form of legal privilege in most jurisdictions could be seen as an argument for 
legal privilege as a general principle of law internationally. The idea is that its existence in 
most jurisdictions indicates that it contains a core set of common values, whereby it can 
be considered a general principle of law.197  
Further, commentators have pointed out that the possible critique of national privileges 
being too varied in scope for them to become a general principle of law is rather 
irrelevant, as universal acceptance or uniformity is not and has not been a precondition 
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for the formation of general principles of international law.198 Even if the choice of law 
analysis would not require arbitrators to consider the possibility of legal privilege 
constituting a general principle of law, they can very well do so and as a conclusion lean 
towards applying legal privilege to the dispute as a general principle of international 
law.199 
Also, privileges might be applied in arbitration as part of international public policy or 
ordre public international.200 One of the grounding arguments against this view, however, 
is that international public policy is traditionally viewed as a type of ultimate ground rule 
dismissing especially the most morally detrimental activities such as serious crimes like 
bribery, drug trafficking and violence.201  
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3. Practical considerations and proposed solutions 
This chapter will deal with the most relevant scenarios and problems regarding legal 
privilege in international arbitration. Privilege claims may be used in bad faith in an effort 
to disrupt the arbitral proceedings, whereby the powers of an arbitrator to deal with such 
claims may become important, also as a deterrent to parties contemplating such dilatory 
claims. In addition, after determining the applicable law of legal privilege the arbitrator 
may face a greater challenge in trying to determine whether the information at issue is de 
facto privileged; document reviews are sometimes proposed as a solution but their use 
does not come without problems. 
With regards to the scope of different regimes of legal privilege, the status of in-house 
counsel is one of the most important causes of problems related to legal privilege in 
international arbitral proceedings, as some jurisdictions, especially under common law, 
consider in-house counsel communications privileged whereas other jurisdictions do not. 
Also, waiver of legal privilege is an issue which may take place more easily in certain 
jurisdictions, for instance, depending on the strictness of the lawyer’s duty to protect the 
confidentiality of relevant communications. 202  Further, the overall applicability of 
domestic ethical standards, mainly lawyer’s codes of conduct, in international arbitration 
may have to be taken into consideration by the arbitrator as such standards are 
sometimes an important source of legal privilege. 
Ultimately, this Chapter will present the recommended solutions to a privilege dispute. 
These solutions follow certain choice of law standards in an attempt to further 
predictability but do so by taking into consideration the demands of party equality and 
parties’ legitimate expectations. The proposed solutions aim to provide arbitrators with 
means to reach a compromise so that the finality of the arbitral award will not be 
jeopardized. 
3.1. Certain practical considerations 
By now it has been presented how an arbitrator will apply his discretion when 
approaching privilege disputes. The arbitral principles and choice of law standards which 
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where cultural approaches differ, but the question is beyond the ambit of this thesis. 
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will affect the arbitral solution have been introduced and the status of regulatory support 
examined. At this point it is time to take a practical perspective and research the 
particularly relevant scenarios regarding legal privilege in international arbitration. First of 
all, the parts of the arbitral proceedings, where legal privilege is likely to emerge and 
cause problems, will be presented. Second, certain features regarding the nature and 
scope of legal privilege itself will be examined due to the relevance of these features as a 
cause of problems during international arbitral proceedings. 
3.1.1. Privilege claims, good faith and negative inferences 
In international arbitration, legal privilege related issues will most likely emerge in 
connection with disclosure proceedings, mainly due to the use of legal privilege as a basis 
for objecting disclosure requests or orders.203  
In disclosure proceedings a party can request another party to present it with documents 
needed as evidence, or the arbitrator can order production of such documents. Disclosure 
proceedings are by now an important element in most international arbitral proceedings 
as “hardly an arbitration is without a request for [disclosure]”.204  
The disclosure proceedings conducted in international arbitration are not to be mixed up 
with the discovery and disclosure systems adopted in the United States and England, or 
with any other domestic system.205 Instead, international arbitration combines elements 
from various national systems.206 Consensus is said to exist on the fact that having some 
level of disclosure is appropriate and that a tribunal can determine the specific level of 
disclosure on a case-by-case basis within its discretion.207 Indeed, most acts, rules and 
guidelines concerned with arbitration leave it to the arbitrator’s discretion to decide on 
                                                          
203 Discussions on document disclosure in international arbitration have sometimes been affected 
by the tensions between different cultural notions as to what evidentiary proceedings should be 
like. The sometimes negative tone inherent in comments referring to disclosure proceedings as 
“fishing expeditions” has much to say about the manner in which parties not familiar with such 
means of evidence taking react to its use in international arbitration. Yet, differences in the nature 
of civil proceedings can be just as significant inside a certain legal system as between different 
legal systems. See e.g. Redfern & Hunter at p. 385-386. 
204 Kaufmann-Kohler & Bärtsch, p. 13. 
205 Kaufmann-Kohler & Bärtsch, p. 15-17. 
206 Kaufmann-Kohler & Bärtsch, p. 17. 
207 ibid. 
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the particular contents of the arbitral proceedings in the event that the parties have not 
agreed on the matter.208 
As disclosure proceedings are very common in international arbitral proceedings, efforts 
to object disclosure requests and orders become called for, as they can have a significant 
impact on the final result of the dispute when evidence that is central to the adverse 
party’s case can be blocked from the proceedings.  
Legal privilege is used in increasing amounts209 as a basis for objecting disclosure requests 
or orders.210 In practice, the outlines of claiming legal privilege in international arbitration 
can be described as follows:   
“privilege cannot be relied on as a blanket defense to disclosure. Objections 
must be raised and considered on a case-by-case basis and the privilege must 
be claimed with respect to each specific communication at issue. Courts will 
not simply accept a blanket claim for privilege covering all communications 
between a lawyer and his client.”211 
In a similar vein, Shaughnessy points out, that arbitrators “should respect privileges in 
arbitration but should not allow a party to escape the obligation to disclose important 
evidence by simply making a broad and unsubstantiated claim of privilege”.212 Effective 
privilege claims must thus be well grounded and specified.  
From an arbitrator’s perspective privilege claims can be problematic as they are of the 
character that arbitrators have to resolve them conclusively before continuing with the 
evidentiary proceedings, as opposed to, for example, other objections on admissibility 
where the arbitrator can very well allow certain evidence, but then give it little attention 
in reality.213 If evidence is subject to a privilege, a party should not be forced to reveal the 
evidence nor should an arbitrator order it to be produced and thus allow for it to be 
admitted as evidence.214  
                                                          
208 See e.g. Waincymer at p. 50 and Redfern & Hunter at p. 397. 
209 See, for example, Heitzmann at p. 205. 
210 For instance, Alvarez at p. 692 states that ”[p]rivilege is an accepted basis for resisting the 
production of a document or information in document production.” 
211 Sindler & Wüstemann, p. 617. 
212 Shaughnessy 2007, p. 469. 
213 Shaughnessy 2007, p. 464. 
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Arbitrators generally have to take privilege claims into consideration when they are raised, 
instead of dismissing them outright, so that parties’ procedural rights of fair and equal 
treatment are not breached.215 In general, arbitrators faced with privilege claims tend to 
have two options: either accept the claim of privilege or order the evidence to be 
produced and if refused, potentially allow the issue to be referred to a state court for 
assistance with evidence-taking.216 However, parties sometimes insist on not disclosing 
even after their claims to privilege have been judged unfounded, but arbitrators have only 
limited powers in dealing with such recalcitrant parties. If a privilege claim is considered 
unfounded, tribunals may face difficulties in making the party disclose the requested 
documents. 
Arbitrators generally do not have powers to compel someone who has refused to adhere 
to a disclosure request or order.217 The only real tool available to an arbitrator to be used 
against a party refusing to disclose is the possibility to draw negative inferences in the 
final award. This is a power that is “well established as a matter of international 
arbitration practice”.218 It is mentioned in some national arbitration acts,219 institutional 
arbitration rules220 and Article 9(5) of the IBA Rules, which provides as follows: 
“If a Party fails without satisfactory explanation to produce any Document 
requested in a Request to Produce to which it has not objected in due time or 
fails to produce any Document ordered to be produced by the Arbitral 
Tribunal, the Arbitral Tribunal may infer that such document would be adverse 
to the interests of the Party.” 
Thus arbitrators have the right to infer that the contents of the document or 
communication would have been adverse to the interests of the party failing to produce 
it.221 On a general level, it should be noted that in cases where a party requesting 
                                                          
215 Alvarez, p. 687. 
216 For instance, Article 27 of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides that ”[t]he tribunal or a party 
with the approval of the arbitral tribunal may request from a competent court of this State 
assistance in taking evidence” and that “[t]he court may execute the request within its 
competence and according to its rules on taking evidence. Similar provisions providing for the 
possibility to seek court assistance are included in many national arbitration acts, for example in 
Section 26 of the Swedish Arbitration Act and in Section 29 of the Finnish Arbitration Act. This 
thesis will not further address the issue of court assistance in international arbitration. 
217 Gaillard & Savage, p. 696-698. 
218 Greenberg & Lautenschlager, p. 181. 
219 See e.g. statute 41(7) of the English Arbitration Act. 
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disclosure wishes negative inferences to be drawn from the other party’s refusal to 
disclose, the requirements for the successful obtainment of adverse inference can be hard 
to fill in reality.222 
With regards to legal privilege and negative inferences, some reactionary powers would 
seem justifiable, especially in cases where privilege claims are found ungrounded and are 
used in an effort to delay or obstruct the proceedings. Yet, importantly, negative 
inferences may be drawn only in cases where the claim of legal privilege is judged to have 
been made in bad faith.223  
Therefore, if a party refuses to produce on the basis of an alleged privilege, the arbitrator 
should not draw negative inferences from the party’s actions “unless there is good cause 
to believe that a party is invoking the privilege in bad faith”224. In Article 9(5) of the IBA 
Rules this precondition is expressed as the requirement of a “satisfactory explanation”.  
If a party can provide a satisfactory explanation as to why disclosure is refused, the 
arbitrator should not draw negative inferences. If negative inferences are in general drawn 
too lightly, the threat of them might force a party to choose between revealing privileged 
communications and suffering negative inferences which possibly do not even reflect the 
truth.225 A party might also consider itself compelled to disclose privilege information and 
then challenge the award later on the basis of such “coerced disclosure”.226 Indeed, 
balancing between breaching a privilege and facing negative inferences can prove 
problematic to a party but after all, as Shaughnessy argues, the well-established status of 
                                                          
222 For these requirements, see especially the deductions made by Sharpe from arbitral case law at 
p. 554-570. The requirements are: (i) the party seeking the adverse inference must produce all 
available evidence corroborating the inference sought; (ii) the requested evidence must be 
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with facts in the record and logically related to the likely nature of the evidence withheld; (iv) the 
party seeking the adverse inference must produce prima facie evidence; and (v) the inference 
opponent must know, or have reason to know, of its obligation to produce evidence rebutting the 
adverse inference sought. 
223 Shaughnessy 2007, p. 468. 
224 Shaughnessy 2007, p. 468. 
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privileges in modern judicial systems is such that parties should not be penalized for 
claiming such rights.227  
The drawing of negative inferences may not be an efficient deterrent to parties in all cases 
concerning legal privilege. Sometimes rules of legal privilege may require a party to assert 
the privilege vigorously in order to not waive it implicitly or otherwise.228 If this is the 
case, parties might very well be wisest to keep on asserting the privilege, even at the cost 
of arbitrators drawing negative inferences.229 Such a situation is indeed descriptive of the 
strategies a party making a claim of legal privilege might apply. The fact that the tribunal 
considers legal privilege not to apply and orders disclosure does not mean that the party 
cannot insist on keeping the information to itself even if this could result in the arbitrator 
drawing negative inferences. 
The drawing of negative inferences has some practical problems also with regards to a 
certain lack of transparency as arbitrators rarely state the use of this power in final 
awards.230 Also situations where information is not disclosed because the attorney is 
legally bound not to do so are problematic; in such cases it is unlikely for the arbitrator to 
penalize the party which refused to disclose.231  
There is also the interesting question of what is meant by “good faith”? Legal systems 
differ in their approaches to good faith, and counsel’s obligation to act according to it is 
not a universal standard; for instance, in England its status is not as well recognized as in 
civil law jurisdictions.232 The concept is very much dependent on the tradition, culture and 
system in which it appears, whereby the inclusion of a good faith requirement into the 
most recent version of the IBA Rules in 2010 without defining the concept has resulted in 
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critique.233 At this outset, arbitrators might not be faced with a simple task in defining 
whether or not a privilege claim was made in good faith. 
The recently published IBA Guidelines on Party Representation in International 
Arbitration234 (hereinafter: “IBA Guidelines”), which are the result of the work of the Task 
Force on Counsel Conduct in International Arbitration established in 2008, provide some 
insight to the good faith condition related with claims of legal privilege. As guidelines, 
their application is voluntary, in a similar vein to the IBA Rules applied on the taking of 
evidence, but the drafters of these guidelines have clearly had in mind some of the 
problems which generally relate to objections to disclosure requests. Guideline 13 
provides that: 
“[a] Party Representative should not make any Request to Produce, or any 
objection to a Request to Produce, for an improper purpose, such as to harass 
or cause unnecessary delay.” 
The guideline is an indication of the fact that objections to disclosure are sometimes used 
with calculated risk in an aim to obstruct the proceedings when sanctions for such 
maneuvers are too light to deter counsel from such conduct. In the commentary section 
regarding guidelines 12-17, which concern information exchange and disclosure, it is 
argued that “Party Representatives are often unsure whether and to what extent their 
respective domestic standards of professional conduct apply” to proceedings concerning 
document disclosure, and that different domestic standards of different representatives 
might very well apply to the same proceedings.235  
In view of the subject at issue, the IBA Guidelines serve most of all as further 
acknowledgement of the problems existing in international arbitration with regards to 
objections to disclosure requests and the potential use of such objections as means to 
                                                          
233 See especially Martínez-Fraga at p. 59-64 who presents how “good faith” can have a variety of 
meanings already within U.S. common law depending on the context of its use. He continues to 
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obstruct or delay the arbitral proceedings.236 The wording of guideline 13, namely 
“improper purpose”, and the examples of harassment and delay serve as practical 
examples of bad faith conduct. Objections made for the purpose of harassment and delay 
are the obvious opposite of good faith objections, but drawing a more specific line 
between good faith and bad faith objections can be challenging.  
As Park expresses it, “[m]ore often, however, perceptions of abuse rest on cultural 
assumptions about the baselines and yardstick that measure ‘normal’ procedure”.237 It is 
up to the arbitrator to take into consideration the background of the party and analyze 
whether an objection is indeed made in good faith or if it is actually a part of dilatory 
tactics.238 
3.1.2. De facto evaluation and document reviews 
In practice, the challenges with choosing an applicable law might not even be the real 
issue for an arbitrator who is dealing with a claim of legal privilege because the question 
of whether or not communications or documents are de facto privileged often proves 
most difficult to establish.239  It is up to the arbitrator to decide whether certain 
documents are in fact privileged but it falls to the party asserting the privilege to prove its 
applicability in a given situation.240 The burden of proof regarding the contents of a party’s 
domestic law of legal privilege falls on the party claiming the privilege as arbitrators 
cannot be expected to have requisite knowledge of such legislation.241 Thus the common 
principle where the burden of proof is on the party making the claim is applied to 
privilege claims made in international arbitration. When it is up to the party to show the 
existence of the privilege, the tribunal is relieved from any need to conduct its own 
                                                          
236 Such soft law guidelines can just as well be considered a new source for nuisance and 
unnecessary paperwork in arbitral proceedings. See e.g. Schneider for a vivid critique of the IBA 
Guidelines. He describes the guidelines as a solution to “what in reality appears only as a marginal 
problem” and that they risk “becoming a major source of procedural motions and disruption” at p. 
497. Further, with regards to the alleged problem, he finds that a solution “is not resolved but 
aggravated” at p. 498. 
237 Park at p. 264-265. See also p. 269-271 on abuse of procedural rights in the form of, among 
others, inappropriate objections. 
238 See e.g. Fortier at p. 403 who points out that an arbitrator has not only the power to speed up 
proceedings when necessary but also “a duty to do so”. 
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investigations into the contents of the applied law. However, the tribunal will of course 
evaluate whether the legislation has been applied properly and whether the privilege 
exists as claimed by the party.242  
In this phase of the proceedings it might become relevant for the arbitrator to somehow 
review the documents at issue so as to assure himself of their privileged nature. After all, 
an arbitrator may well face the following question: how to know whether a privilege 
actually exists without having a look at the protected communication or document? 
Commentators seem to be somewhat divided as to the appropriateness of a review 
procedure but if applied it would result in either the tribunal itself or a third party expert 
reviewing the allegedly privileged documents without allowing the requesting party to do 
the same.243 Such a review is potentially necessary in cases where the tribunal tries to 
determine if, and to what extent, protection is needed. Some authors are of the view that 
the “tribunal can review the documents itself without the party requesting the 
documents having access to them” as long as parties have consented to it.244  
However, if parties have not agreed on the use of such a review, certain principles of due 
process might be at risk. In cases where the tribunal decides to review the documents 
itself, any principles of fair process are certainly in danger of being breached as the 
requesting party is denied access to documents which in reality are at the disposal of both 
the arbitrator and the other party.245 Such a review is considered a certain route to the 
setting aside of an award, at least in Sweden, in cases where the objection has not been 
waived and the evidence probably affected the outcome of the case.246 In accordance 
with some of the most important principles of civil procedure applied in the Nordic 
countries, such as the principle of “communication” and “contradiction”, adjudicators may 
not have access to evidence which the opposing party has not had an opportunity to 
review and comment upon.247  
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Document review is also connected with one particular problem which applies to 
inadmissible evidence in general. Even if a document is declared privileged as a result of a 
review, the tribunal has still seen it and possibly been affected by it. In practice, it is 
possible for parties to take a calculated risk by presenting the tribunal with potentially 
privileged or confidential information in an effort to strengthen the perception of their 
own position or weaken that of the other party.248 How can an arbitrator relieve himself 
of such impressions and remain neutral in his decision-making process? 
Removing an impression which has already developed in the mind of the arbitrator can be 
very difficult, even if he decides that the reviewed evidence should not be allowed.249 By 
providing a tribunal with damaging information, even temporarily, a party can have a 
significant impact on the tribunal’s assessment.250 If the information has a strong potential 
to leave the arbitrator with a certain impression, the review can have a real effect on the 
case even if the reviewed evidence is found inadmissible. 
As an answer to these considerable threats connected with a review conducted by the 
tribunal in-camera, the possibility of a third-party review has been suggested as an 
alternative. The use of a neutral expert has the benefit of allowing the continuation of the 
proceedings on other matters while the expert searches documents for privileged 
content.251 Expert reviewers could be used so that after reviewing the documents, they 
present the tribunal and parties with their conclusions on the matter. However, it does 
remain possible that parties will not follow such third-party recommendations whereby 
the privilege issue would remain.252 For instance, a party might in practice continue to 
claim the privilege even if an expert reviewer has come to the conclusion that the 
privilege does not apply. In some cases an expert review may also have potentially 
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negative consequences, for instance, if the review is interpreted as a waiver of 
privilege.253 
3.1.3. The case of in-house counsel 
One of the main issues causing problems with regards to legal privilege in international 
arbitration is the status of lawyers who are employed by corporations to work as in-house 
counsel. The status of in-house counsel and their right to legal privilege in different 
jurisdictions can become a central issue in international arbitral proceedings as 
communications between a party and its in-house counsel could often serve as valuable 
evidence for the opposing party. 
Even though a simple juxtaposition between common and civil law jurisdictions often 
seems tempting, it must be said that variations as to the status of in-house counsel and 
legal privilege exist even inside Europe.254 In the United States and England legal privilege 
applies to in-house counsel when the communication relates to giving legal advice and 
not business advice in general.255 On the other hand under civil law, some countries such 
as Belgium256, Spain257 and Denmark258 provide in-house counsel with similar rights to rely 
on legal privilege while in others, such as in France259, Sweden260 and Italy261, this is not 
the case as in-house counsel may not invoke such a privilege.262 However, some argue that 
both common and civil law systems share similar ambitions: a need for open 
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communication to acquire legal advice and the necessity of reassuring those seeking 
advice that such communications will not be used against them later on.263  
To further understand the potential dilemma caused by legal privileges and the status of 
in-house lawyers, consider the following situation, as presented by Kaufmann-Kohler and 
Bärtsch: 
"What if a German corporation faces a US firm in arbitration in Switzerland 
and each of them seeks communications between management and in-house 
counsels of the opponent?"264 
In the situation above Swiss law is the law of arbitration and both laws of United States 
and Germany seem potentially applicable to the communications. Thus, the arbitrator is 
faced with several alternative laws of legal privilege.265 
In European jurisdictions, it is often the independence of lawyers which is regarded 
decisive in evaluating whether or not communications between a client and a certain 
lawyer are privileged. The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) has emphasized the 
importance of lawyer’s independence in determining the scope of legal privilege. The 
current position on in-house counsel in cases involving EU law, especially EU competition 
law, is based on the ruling of ECJ in the recent case Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros 
Chemicals Ltd v Commission266 (“Akzo”) where ECJ dismissed an appeal brought by Akzo 
Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Ackros Chemicals Ltd against a judgment of the General Court267, 
and confirmed that legal privilege does not apply to a company and its in-house counsel in 
the context of antitrust investigations. Thus ECJ confirmed in Akzo the position taken by it 
earlier in AM & S Europe Ltd v. Commission268 (“AM&S”) in 1982, where it held that 
although the scope and the criteria for applying legal privilege varied, a common principle 
existed amongst the member states with respect to the confidentiality of written 
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communications between lawyer and client provided that such communications are made 
for the purposes and in the interests of the client's rights of defense and that they 
emanate from independent lawyers (emphasis added). 269  Thus ECJ has set two 
preconditions for confidentiality of communications between lawyer and client: (i) such 
communications are made for the purposes of the exercise of the client's rights of defense 
and (ii) they emanate from independent lawyers, i.e. lawyers who are not bound to the 
client by a relationship of employment.270 Further, the ruling limits the applicability of 
legal privilege to independent lawyers qualified to practice in one of the member states, 
meaning that along with in-house lawyers also non-EU private practitioners fall outside 
the protection of legal privilege, at least in antitrust investigations.271 
According to ECJ the requirement of independent status “is based on the conception of 
the lawyer’s role as collaborating in the administration of justice by the courts and as 
being required to provide, in full independence, and in the overriding interest of that 
cause, such legal advice as the client needs”.272 This requirement of independence 
remains at the core of the European legal privilege considerations. It shows how ECJ 
assumed and continues to assume that once employed by a company, a lawyer is no 
longer capable of remaining free “from improper influence by his client”273. 
Although the ruling in AM&S fell under debate and critique, the reactions did reflect the 
local approaches to privilege adopted in the member states. Thus critique was loudest in 
countries where in-house counsel were regarded perfectly equal to private practitioners 
also in view of legal privilege, whereas countries in which the Bar membership of in-house 
counsel was considered inappropriate remained less visible in the debate.  
As critique was already heard after AM&S in 1982, it is easy to imagine that some 
professionals were disappointed when the position was eventually not reviewed in the 
Akzo case. For instance, with regards to Akzo at General Court, some commentators had 
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highlighted that the ruling had been a part of antitrust investigations, and that while 
denying the applicability of legal privilege to in-house counsel, the General Court had 
emphasized that because infringements of competition rules are "often carefully 
concealed and usually very harmful to the proper functioning of the common market […], 
the possibility of treating a preparatory document as covered by legal privilege must be 
construed restrictively".274 Thus the interest of rigorous protection of competition law 
principles had outweighed the importance of legal privilege in this case, from one point of 
view.  Based on this it has been pointed out that communications of in-house counsel 
might still be covered where such privilege exists and that the possibility of considering a 
document being covered by legal privilege would be higher in cases not including 
infringements of competition rules.275 Even though ECJ did not follow this wording in 
Akzo, the fact remains that the case did handle specifically competition investigations.276 
The approach to legal privilege rooted in the AM&S case has been criticized also because 
lawyers in some EU member states might have fallen under discrimination as a result of 
the ruling. This is due to the fact that even though in-house counsel are admitted to Bar in 
some member states and thus are fully licensed to practice and subject to any ethical 
rules in their jurisdiction, AM&S denied them the right to legal privilege which their 
privately practicing domestic colleagues had.277 Hill argues that as a result, such in-house 
counsel are put in an unfair position in comparison to other lawyers practicing in the same 
country.278 
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On the national level in Europe, the potential protection of in-house counsel’s 
communications is often closely linked with the possibility of in-house counsel to be 
members of national Bars. For instance, in Germany, although the situation is apparently 
far from settled, in-house counsel who are admitted to the Bar and are allowed to 
practice law also as attorneys with other clients than their company, may invoke legal 
privilege also with regards to the legal advice they provide to their employer as in-house 
counsel.279 On the contrary, in Switzerland and France in-house counsel are generally not 
permitted to become members of a Bar as they are not regarded sufficiently independent 
due to their employment as in-house counsel.280 
Indeed, Bar membership seems to be connected to some extent with the possibilities of 
in-house counsel to invoke legal privilege. While common law in-house counsel are 
admitted to Bar and thus can become bound by solicitor's code of ethics, some civil law 
in-house counsel are not perceived sufficiently independent in relation to their employer 
and therefore are not allowed membership in Bars which then results in Bar rules not 
applying to them.281  
Although the adherence or non-adherence to Bar rules and codes of ethics has to have 
some effect in practice, it is a rightful question to raise whether the membership of an 
international in-house counsel in some national Bar really can be so significant that it be 
used to decide whether or not privilege applies in a given case. One could argue that such 
membership is merely coincidental and that it would be far-fetched to rule out legal 
privilege solely on such grounds.282 As it happens, in-house counsel around the world may 
generally have very similar tasks, while from a party's perspective it might seem unfair or 
at least unforeseeable that the existence or non-existence of confidential communications 
might depend on the rather random matter of a counsel's nationality and membership to 
a certain Bar.283 
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The position on in-house counsel and legal privilege in the United States is quite different. 
The local attorney-client privilege has been recognized for in-house counsel since at least 
1915.284 The issues there are first, who exactly is the client, and second, how far should 
the privilege be extended.285 With regards to the status of in-house counsel, the question 
of who in a particular company should be included under the protection of attorney-client 
privilege has been relevant in United States.286 
The most relevant U.S. case of late is the Supreme Court’s ruling in Upjohn Co. v. United 
States287 (“Upjohn”). The Supreme Court confirmed that attorney-client privilege applies 
to in-house counsel, but it did not use the opportunity to clearly explain the exact scope 
attorney-client privilege with regards to in-house counsel, whereby lower courts have 
continued to disagree on the matter to some extent.288  
According to commentaries, there are two major justifications for U.S. attorney-client 
privilege; the traditional justification and the privacy justification. The former is based on 
ideas of the best administration of justice necessitating candid communications between 
lawyer and client, and the latter on ideas of individual privacy and autonomy.289  Upjohn 
resembles the traditional justification of attorney-client privilege in the United States, 
according to which the best administration of justice can only occur when clients have full 
and frank communications with their lawyers.  
In defining the scope of privileges before Upjohn U.S. courts used to apply either a 
“subject matter” test or a “control group” test, which limited the privilege to those 
managing the company and otherwise taking a substantial part in corporate decisions, 
thus focusing, rather narrowly, on the group of people with whom the attorney 
communicates instead of focusing on the nature of the communication.290 In Upjohn the 
Supreme Court emphasized the importance of not limiting the group protected by 
privilege too much because the flow of information from corporate employees to the 
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lawyer needed to be guaranteed and any inhibitions removed.291 However, while the 
Supreme Court dismissed the earlier “control group” test, the ruling does not provide 
guidance on the exact extent in which attorney-client privilege applies to in-house counsel 
and corporate clients.  
While the “control group” test limits attorney-client privilege only to those authorized to 
make decisions in a corporation, the subject matter test focuses on the nature and 
circumstances of the employee communication.292 Although the Court’s approach in 
Upjohn could be seen to resemble the subject matter test, the Court itself named it a 
case-by-case approach 293  and by analyzing the facts of the case, emphasized the 
importance of certain factors in justifying the privilege. 
These factors, which are the basis for the Court’s finding that attorney-client privileges 
applied between Upjohn employees and Upjohn in-house counsel, can perhaps prove 
helpful when trying to understand why in-house counsel are indeed protected under 
attorney-client privilege in the United States.294 According to Greenberg, these factors 
were: 
“(1) the communications at issue were made by Upjohn employees to in-
house counsel in his capacity as such; (2) corporate superiors had directed the 
employees’ communications in order to secure legal advice from counsel; (3) 
the information obtained was not available from upper echelon management; 
(4) the communications concerned matter within the scope of the employees’ 
corporate duties; (5) the employees were aware that they were being 
questioned that the corporation might obtain legal advice; and (6) the 
information was considered confidential, and continued to be treated as 
such.”295 
An important distinction in the applicability of U.S. attorney-client privilege to in-house 
counsel is that the privilege applies only if in-house counsel are providing legal advice and 
stay outside of business matters. Understandably, drawing this distinction can be 
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challenging as in-house counsel are often much more involved in a company’s business 
decisions than outside counsel.296 
The fact that communications between an in-house counsel and the employer company 
are protected under some jurisdictions but not under others can cause difficulties during 
the evidentiary phase of international arbitral proceedings. If legal privilege applies to in-
house counsel, a corporate party can refuse to disclose documents or other evidence that 
relate to such communications. On the other hand, the other party might be unable to 
invoke legal privilege according to the rules of legal privilege that apply to it, whereby it 
would have no valid legal privilege defense against disclosure requests. In such a case in-
house communications of one party could be disclosed while those of the other party 
could not. Such a situation would likely be considered unfair and unequal by the disclosing 
part and even by a state court later on; the party suffering from unequal treatment could 
indeed seek the setting aside of the award or refusal regarding its recognition or 
enforcement. 
3.1.4. Waiver of legal privilege 
An arbitrator may also have to determine whether or not a party has waived its right to 
legal privilege, whereby any claims regarding such rights would be considered void. First 
of all, some have raised the question whether a party by entering into an arbitration 
agreement can also be considered as having waived its rights to any privileges, including 
legal privilege.297 This question is relevant in cases where the arbitration act or rules 
voluntarily chosen by the parties do not clearly recognize legal privilege as a protective 
measure in evidentiary proceedings. Therefore, if a party has agreed to follow such rules 
in the arbitration agreement, has he also consented to waiving any privileges and thus 
agreed to produce documents, which would otherwise be protected by the waived 
privilege, when their disclosure is requested during the proceedings?298  
Other authors suggest that a waiver of privileges caused by the fact that a party chooses 
to enter into arbitration is based on an acceptance of the broad discretion of an arbitrator, 
in the sense that parties who enter into arbitration signal that they are willing to rely on 
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the arbitrator to determine how privileges are best applied.299 The idea is that such 
parties rather prefer “case-by-case” efficiency tests and a “practical application of 
fairness”, instead of strict appliance of their domestic privilege rules.300 
Yet, as was presented earlier, the few arbitration acts which mention privileges demand 
that they be respected accordingly. Indeed, the proposition that parties waive their rights 
to legal privilege by agreeing to partake in largely unregulated arbitral proceedings is 
dismissed by some with the statement that as fundamental rights, privileges can only be 
waived by express agreements of the right holders stating so.301 Further, such a waiver 
does seem to some as a rather extreme consequence for choosing to resolve disputes in a 
system which is in reality quite a crucial part of doing business internationally.302 
In common law jurisdictions, even more so in the United States, legal privilege is a pure 
evidentiary issue, “making the client the ultimate beneficiary of any right to claim 
privilege”303 who can therefore also waive it either explicitly or “by implication, by failing 
to take sufficient measures to protect the confidentiality of the privileged 
communications, or by simply disclosing the communication”.304 So waiver of legal 
privilege can sometimes result already implicitly from the client’s actions.  
The problem of waiver has also been approached by exploring litigation in the United 
States, where a party can comply with a court subpoena to produce privileged documents 
without necessarily waiving the legal privilege. In this case, the production is obligatory 
and the party has not voluntarily agreed to reveal the confidential information and 
therefore, there is no waiver.305 As a result, Rubinstein and Guerrina move to question if in 
arbitral proceedings, which are voluntary from the start, it could be that document 
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production at the tribunal’s request even involuntarily constitutes a voluntary waiver of 
the privilege due to the fact the party originally did agree to arbitration voluntarily?306 If 
this truly would be the case, it might be seen as being against parties’ legitimate 
expectations, depending on the jurisdictional background of the parties. 
On the other hand, in most civil law jurisdictions legal privilege belongs to the lawyer, 
which changes the approach to the waivability of legal privilege. Now it is the lawyer’s 
responsibility to acknowledge what information is privileged and when such information 
can be disclosed as the privilege is based on a professional secrecy obligation.307 Once 
again it deserves to be pointed out that legal privilege under the common law regime 
seems “in rem, i.e., attached to a document in particular”308 whereas in civil law systems, 
at least in France, legal privilege is “ad personam, i.e., intertwined with the person of the 
counsel”309. In a European context, the French provisions on the waivability of legal 
privilege are particularly strict as the lawyer “may not be relieved of his obligation of 
secrecy by his client, or by anyone else”.310 For instance, a lawyer may not disclose 
information regarding a matter to third parties at the request of the party.311 Yet, although 
a lawyer cannot be relieved of his secrecy obligations under French legislation, the benefit 
of professional secrecy may be waived by the client if he makes public a communication 
between him and his lawyer.312  
A specific question of waiver relates to situations where parties use confidentiality 
agreements to protect privileged information. If a party for some reason decides to 
disclose privileged information, the confidentiality of the information can be protected by 
making a confidentiality agreement between the parties. But if one party reveals 
privileged information that was produced in the context of an arbitral proceeding to 
outside parties, has the privileged nature of the information been lost because it is no 
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longer confidential?313 To protect privileged information, parties can for instance agree 
that all privileged documents are returned or destroyed at the conclusion of the 
proceedings.314 
As presented above, waiver of legal privilege is very much linked with the question of who 
does legal privilege “belong to” in international arbitration, the lawyer or the client.  
One suggested answer can be derived from the core principle of party autonomy. 
Rubinstein and Guerrina have presented party autonomy as a justification for the view 
that privileges should belong to parties instead of lawyers in international arbitration thus 
making it possible for the parties to always decide on the matter of waiver.315 This 
approach could clear the way for a simplified approach to waiver of legal privilege in 
international arbitration, but such an approach can prove harmful to lawyers practicing 
under strict criminally sanctioned rules of legal privilege where the protection of 
privileged information is the lawyer’s responsibility. 316 If a client was allowed to waive 
legal privilege under such circumstances, the lawyers could still face sanctions in 
accordance with the professional and penal codes of their jurisdiction. 
3.1.5. Codes of conduct and legal privilege 
One important matter regarding the subject at issue is the fact that legal privilege is in 
many countries based on lawyers’ codes of conduct, which are often supervised and 
enforced by local Bar associations. Normally the application of such rules is not restricted 
to the country where the lawyer is qualified but instead the rules in a way follow the 
lawyer wherever he goes for professional purposes. 317  Codes of conduct set the 
professional with certain standards which he must follow when practicing the profession. 
With regards to privileged information, codes of conduct often clarify what information is 
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to be considered confidential and when and under what circumstances it can be 
disclosed.318 
However, the applicability of lawyers’ ethical standards in international arbitration has not 
enjoyed too much attention even though such standards might be very relevant in light of 
the arbitral proceedings. With regards to privileged information, an important question is 
how, according to the ethical standards, lawyers will treat any privileged information 
belonging to the other party but which they have, for one reason or another, gotten hold 
of? The question has enjoyed significant attention in common law courts and litigation 
where a breach of one’s own ethical standards in the handling of other’s privileged 
information can have heavy consequences.319  
Equal treatment of the parties and the integrity of the proceedings are at the focal point 
of any concerns regarding the application of lawyer’s ethical standards in arbitral 
proceedings. Alvarez points out, that such rules are not irrelevant to a tribunal’s 
determination of privilege matters even if the application of codes of conduct and the 
sanctioning of any breaches of such rules might fall outside the tribunal’s mandate.320 As 
ethical standards are aimed at providing some integrity and fairness to lawyers’ conduct, a 
tribunal can find them informative when it tries to establish a certain standard for the 
proceedings. Even if situations of improper handling of privileged information might be 
exceptional, they do serve as an example of situations where codes of conduct and ethical 
standards might become relevant also to a tribunal as such codes and standards often 
originate from efforts to guarantee procedural fairness.321 
3.2. Proposed solutions to the legal privilege dilemma 
Legal privilege disputes in international arbitration are essentially a matter of choice of 
law. Arbitration acts and rules provide little guidance on how to choose a law of legal 
privilege but those that do mention privileges call for an appropriate arbitral solution 
based on discretion. Any choice to be made has to be based on considerations of party’s 
expectations and party equality. Parties tend to expect that such fundamental procedural 
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rights as legal privilege will be respected also in arbitration in the manner that 
communications which once were confidential will stay confidential also in international 
arbitral proceedings. An arbitrator is well advised to respect such expectations but in 
doing so he could end up applying one set of rules on one party and another set of rules 
on the other; if the rules provide for a different scope of protection, the arbitrator might 
end up treating the parties unequally. Indeed, choosing a law of legal privilege is likely to 
be dictated by demands of equal treatment as will be seen in connection with the 
proposed solutions discussed in this section.  
3.2.1. The closest connection test 
The “closest connection” or “center of gravity” test is perhaps the mostly widely 
acclaimed conflict of laws rule to be used when resolving privilege disputes in 
international arbitration.322 Some regard it a transnational rule, which is often applied by 
tribunals consciously or intuitively.323 Some consider it convenient as it has a well-
established status as a choice of law rule both in Europe and the United States.324 
According to Berger it is the one test which “must also be applied to evidentiary privileges 
in international arbitration”325. In practice, the closest connection means that the law of 
the jurisdiction with which the events or the communication at issue are most closely 
connected must be applied by the tribunal.326 The benefits of applying a well-recognized 
conflict of laws rule when choosing a law of legal privilege is that such an approach is 
likely to provide for some predictability.327 
Indeed, the closest connection test has been said to recognize and give effect to the 
parties' legitimate expectations, and as it is based on quite well-known legal principles, 
many international lawyers are familiar with it.328 Especially for European lawyers, the 
                                                          
322 Tevendale & Cartwright-Finch, p. 831. 
323 Berger, p. 510-511. Compare e.g. with Alvarez at p. 684-685. 
324 von Schlabrendorff and Sheppard, p. 768. 
325 Berger, p. 511. 
326 ibid. 
327 According to Berger this minimum level of predictability guaranteed by the closest connection 
test has been the main justification for the use of what he calls a “rigid and territorial” rule in the 
United States. See Berger at p. 511. 
328 Tevendale & Cartwright-Finch, p. 831. 
68 
 
familiarity stems from Article 4(1) of the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations, which is widely applied in European jurisdictions.329 
Yet, using the closest connection test comes with challenges as well. A closest connection 
seems very reasonable, but with what? The arbitrator must still decide what, in fact, is the 
most relevant connection when determining the law applicable to legal privilege.  
Some argue for the application of the law of the state of the attorney’s practice,330 
whereas others find decisive the law of the place where the entire client-attorney 
relationship has its predominant effects.331 Perhaps hardest to sustain are arguments for 
the application of laws connected with the location of the document or of its creation, as 
modern storing technologies and the mobility of globally practicing professionals make it 
nearly impossible to form a plausible connection between the parties and one specific 
location. 332  Also, directly applying the substantive law governing the dispute is 
problematic as it is highly unlikely that parties, while agreeing on a substantive law, have 
paid any attention to legal privilege under that law or meant for the application of its 
privilege provisions.333 
When searching for the set of legal privilege rules with a closest connection to the 
communications, it can be helpful to consider who in fact has the best knowledge of legal 
privilege in international arbitration. One argument is that lawyers, not parties, are more 
likely better aware of the scope of legal privilege, whereby the law of legal privilege 
applicable to the lawyer, for example the law of his professional domicile, should be 
applied.334 This view has been justified also by the fact that rules of legal privilege are 
often based on codes of ethics which apply on a lawyer in any case, whereby it would be 
sensible to apply to the client same rules as are applied to the lawyer. 335 If a lawyer is 
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practicing somewhere else than at his home jurisdiction, rules of that place might also 
become relevant.336  
The problem with such an approach is the possibility of “forum shopping” if the scope of 
privileged communications depends on the nationality of the attorney.337 Some authors 
have questioned whether it is indeed fair, if the outcome of a dispute regarding legal 
privilege can depend so heavily on which lawyer a party chooses.338 As a counterargument 
to the danger of forum shopping, some argue that other factors, such as an attorney’s 
knowledge of the client’s business and his professional expertise, are likely to affect a 
client’s choice of an attorney more than the applicable rules of legal privilege.339 
On the other hand, it is possible to emphasize the status of the parties and consider their 
legitimate expectations340 which arguably have to have weight in the final choice when 
considering the core values protected by legal privilege in international arbitration. 
Although legal privilege is linked with professional secrecy as well as professional integrity, 
the unique status of the parties in arbitration, not the least because of party autonomy, 
demands the protection of their legitimate expectations in matters of legal privilege. 
Without a doubt parties rely strongly on legal privilege when communicating with their 
lawyers as it is an essential precondition for candid communications. The confidentiality of 
these communications is crucial and widely acknowledged and therefore, it would be 
surprising and unjust to frustrate parties’ legitimate expectations concerning such 
confidentiality.341 Berger argues that in most cases tribunals will apply “the law of the 
jurisdiction where the party has its place of business at the moment the relevant 
communication took place and where most of the attorney-client contact occurred”342. He 
thus takes an opposite stand to those emphasizing the importance of jurisdictions linked 
with the attorney. Even if this approach can provide certainty and safeguard parties’ 
expectations from a certain point of view, it does lead to the unequal treatment of in-
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house counsel practicing within the same country but in international corporations with 
domiciles in different countries.343 
Although it might be tempting to find one applicable rule in order to clarify the matter, 
some commentators are not as willing to bind the closest connection test to one 
predetermined territory, be it the attorney’s place of residence or party’s place of 
business. This is understandable bearing in mind the variety of circumstances potentially 
relating to legal privilege in complex international arbitrations. With a cumulative 
approach an arbitrator can examine several potentially applicable laws to determine if a 
claimed privilege is recognized under each law.344 If all laws recognize the privilege, the 
arbitrator will move to consider whether the evidence at issue falls within the claimed 
privilege.345 On the other hand, if the arbitrator finds that the privilege is recognized by 
some systems but not by others, so that the potentially applicable laws are in conflict, the 
arbitrator must choose a single law that will apply.346 
From a practical perspective, one very relevant challenge faced by an arbitrator applying 
the closest connection test in a strict purist manner is its cumbersome nature in any 
arbitration with an average amount of documents and other evidence at issue. If the test 
is to be made separately on every piece of evidence to ensure that a closest connection is 
found in every case, the arbitrator will quite likely and quite quickly be overloaded with 
work, thus failing to provide swift and flexible proceedings, which is one of the main tasks 
of an arbitrator.347 Most often parties to arbitration will likely value a pragmatic approach 
to choice of law questions over a slow process of piece by piece analysis.348 In order to 
ensure pragmatic and efficient proceedings, a tribunal is therefore likely to look for some 
mid-way approach and apply rules which provide satisfactory recognition of privileges 
with regards to the majority of evidence at issue. Even if the tribunal takes such a “broad-
brush” approach and thus finds one certain rule to apply to one party, it might still be the 
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case that the evidence of the other party is governed by another set of rules, leading 
again to the possible problem of several applicable laws.349 
In the end, the biggest problem with the closest connection rule is, therefore, that its use 
can result in several laws applying to the resolution of privilege issues within the same 
arbitral proceedings. In a dispute, where parties and counsel come from a variety of 
jurisdictions, a closest connection with one party’s communications might very likely point 
to another direction than that with the other party’s communications. This would result in 
different laws being applied to different sides of the dispute. Further, one law might 
provide for far broader confidentiality with regards to communications between lawyer 
and client. Such a situation is likely to result in unequal treatment, if the law closely 
connected to one party’s evidence provides more protection than the law connected to 
the other party’s evidence.350 Simply put, applying different rules to different parties 
“does not appear acceptable…for practical as well as legal reasons”351. 
To summarize, the closest connection test certainly has its benefits being a familiar 
principle to many international lawyers and providing parties with some level of 
predictability when applied pragmatically and with due consideration. It provides a 
workable tool mainly because it is based on familiar and somewhat universal principles, 
which tend to work well also in practice. In determining which law should be considered 
the “most closely connected” one, some laws, such as that of the party’s domicile or that 
of the lawyer’s professional domicile, seem to be favored by commentators more than 
others. The closest connection test has evolved into a rather common choice of law rule 
for arbitrators contemplating legal privilege matters, but especially the difficulties in using 
it to find a set of rules applicable to both sides of the dispute remains a challenge in 
international arbitration. Indeed, the idea of applying some form of non-voluntary 
disclosure while allowing a common law party to claim common law privilege and 
restricting a civil law party to civil law rules certainly suggests a potential breach of party 
equality in the proceedings.352  An answer to this challenge has been found from the most 
favorable privilege approach. 
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 3.2.2. The most favorable privilege approach 
The most favorable privilege approach 353 means that in cases where one party would 
benefit from broader protection under a certain privilege rule and the other party would 
receive less protection under another privilege rule, a tribunal can choose to apply the 
most favorable rule to both parties, mainly in the interest of avoiding unequal 
treatment.354 As the closest connection test can result in different rules applying to 
different parties, the most favorable privilege approach is widely acknowledged as a 
potential solution to privilege disputes in international arbitration.355 In fact some regard 
it “the most appropriate method in order to determine which rules of legal privilege 
should apply in a particular case”356. 
According to the most favorable privilege approach 357 a court is allowed to apply the law 
which provides for broadest protection with regards to legal privilege. As the approach is 
quite widely recognized in litigation358, authors have demanded that arbitral tribunals 
should be allowed to apply the most favorable rules as well. First and foremost, this 
approach could help arbitrators reassure the enforceability of their award, as parties 
would be treated more equally making any privilege based challenges to the award less 
likely. The balancing act with the most favorable privilege approach leads to one party 
gaining a better than expected privilege while the other party acquires a level of 
protection as expected. In other words, the most favorable privilege approach allows “any 
party to an international arbitration to claim the same privileges that are available to any 
other party”359. 
In practice, arbitrators can first use the closest connection test to narrow down their 
alternatives and then proceed to a final decision with the help of the most favorable 
privilege approach, thus allowing any party to claim privileges available to the other 
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party.360 This approach is considered beneficial in providing better predictability and equal 
treatment during the proceedings as party expectations are unlikely to be defeated.361 
Indeed, the most favorable privilege approach is a “common-sense approach”362 to 
privilege disputes in international arbitration. Built in to this approach are two simple 
principles, i.e. parties should be treated equally and attorney-client communications 
should be respected.363 Instead of a classical conflict of laws rule such as the closest 
connection test, the most favorable privilege approach provides the arbitrator with more 
flexibility and perhaps better possibilities to treat the parties in a fair manner, and it will 
assure that the tribunal’s approach is reasonably certain and predictable.364 
The seemingly positive nature of this compromise solution put aside, the approach does 
have its downsides. Mostly commentators have expressed their concerns as to the 
limitations of available evidence caused by the application of the most favorable privilege 
approach.365 This problem is connected with the original justification of legal privilege, 
where the aim of encouraging candid communications between privileged parties justifies 
the exclusion of potentially powerful evidence.366 The situation becomes problematic 
when more protective rules of legal privilege are applied to parties who never expected to 
benefit from them. Such a party was never “induced into making confidential 
communications and thus has no claim to such a privilege”367. When observed from this 
perspective, a disconnection between the justification of the privilege and its invocation 
emerges. Therefore, the most favorable privilege approach has also been described as an 
“easy answer which may result in removing important evidence from the adjudicative 
process”368. This frustration to the search for truth has been denied by those advocating 
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the approach, as they consider it an acknowledgement of party equality and general 
respect towards party-client communications.369 
The most favorable privilege approach does have an alternative called the “least favorable 
privilege approach”. In this case, a tribunal can apply the law providing least protection to 
both parties. The obvious disappointment caused by this approach is the fact that one 
party could experience a serious let down regarding their legitimate expectations, as they 
would be forced to produce evidence which they would have never had to produce 
according to their national legislation. Thus, the least favorable privilege approach would 
treat the parties equally in a way, but could at the same time seem unfair to the party 
experiencing a loss of rights. The situation can be described quite well with the expression 
“equality in unfairness”.370  
The least favorable privilege approach therefore has the obvious downside of being more 
likely to cause complaints from parties; after all, a party is far more likely to complain 
when it is denied rights which it is accustomed to than when benefitting from broader 
than normal protection. Further, when applying the most favorable privilege approach, a 
party is not as likely to protest the gains of the other party, when a compromise is needed 
and the overall equal treatment of both parties is somewhat necessary for gaining an 
enforceable award. As parties usually enter into arbitration with the aim of acquiring a 
final and enforceable award, they are likely to accept some type of compromise regarding 
legal privilege, if the alternative is to provide the other party with a strong case for a 
challenge to the award. 
Interestingly, application of the least favorable privilege approach would not only give 
birth to failed expectations, but could also cause potentially severe consequences to 
attorneys from jurisdictions where legal privilege “belongs” to them and the breach of it is 
criminally or professionally sanctioned. One solution to such a problem is that any 
categories of information which should be kept confidential according to ethical 
restrictions would be immune from disclosure to both parties.371 According to Rubinstein 
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and Guerrina, this approach has been suggested for domestic cases in the United States 
where courts often have to choose between the laws of different states.372 
Assuring the equal treatment of the parties is fundamental to both the most and least 
favorable privilege approaches. The most favorable privilege approach, however, seems to 
be a safer bet as party discontent seems to be more probable when applying the least 
favorable privilege approach. Equality of arms is at the core of applying the most favorable 
privilege approach when choosing a law of legal privilege, because by applying the 
approach the arbitrator will provide the parties with similar procedural rights.373 In the 
end, regardless of its method in choosing a certain standard of legal privilege, the tribunal 
will most likely apply the same standard to both parties; the likelihood of this scenario 
gives the most favorable privilege approach considerable significance in practice. By 
applying it, the tribunal will most likely succeed in respecting the parties’ legitimate 
expectations, or “reasonable aspirations” 374 , and thus diminish the possibility of 
unsatisfied parties raising challenges due to unequal treatment. 
3.2.3. Harmonization as an answer? 
Due to the gaps in current rules, laws and guidelines concerning legal privilege in 
arbitration, many authors have called for the harmonization of such rules, some more 
enthusiastically than others. On the opposing side, some commentators are determined 
that arbitrators’ discretion is needed and that it works best in the resolution of legal 
privilege disputes mainly because current regimes on legal privilege are too far apart and 
too attached to national systems.  
Based largely on party autonomy and arbitrator’s discretion, arbitration currently has only 
a limited amount of harmonized rules. In fact, the application of harmonized rules is 
commonly based on the consent of parties, who for whatever reason decide to resolve 
their disputes within the guidance of, for instance, the IBA Rules. Providing a harmonized 
set of rules to a global community of professionals, who are all eventually bound by 
different jurisdictions and codes of ethics, and then convincing them all to follow such a 
set of rules, is quite a challenging task. Indeed, the application of the most successful 
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harmonized rules is based on a demand for guidance and parties’ voluntariness in 
applying those rules; this has been the case with the IBA Rules, which are the result of the 
International Bar Association’s attempt to clarify contents of the widely unguided 
international arbitral proceedings.375  
Some authors call for similar guidance with respect to the nature and scope of legal 
privilege in international arbitration376. As often with demands for harmonization, such 
requests are justified by a need for better predictability and certainty due to existing lack 
of guidance.377 Yet, beyond a shared understanding on the importance of legal privilege, 
no commonly shared view on the subject at issue seems to have emerged.378  
One undisputable hardship faced by any attempt to harmonize arbitral rules of legal 
privilege is to overcome the tight link which legal privilege currently has with national 
legislation and codes of ethics. As has been presented in earlier sections, parties to 
international arbitration practically always rely on domestic legislation when claiming 
legal privilege. Further, rules of legal privilege reflect the public policy of the national 
systems in which they have been developed.379 It can be challenging to present a 
harmonized approach to disputes regarding such domestically regulated fundamental 
rights of procedure as legal privilege.  
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As with any harmonization, rules of privilege should be general in nature in order for them 
to work properly.  With general rules comes flexibility which in itself calls for arbitrator’s 
discretion; therefore, even a workable harmonization would necessitate the use of 
arbitrator’s discretion in addition to rules.380 Already at the time of the 1999 IBA Rules 
some argued that this “counterpoise between rules and discretion” was already optimal 
and that article 9(2)(g) of the IBA Rules was “as far as one can get in harmonizing these 
rules”.381 As was presented in section 2.4.2. above, the situation was improved when 
Article 9.3 was adopted into the current version of the IBA Rules. Thus there are strong 
arguments for the view that the current discretionary approach to legal privilege is 
sufficient and pragmatic.  
The fact of the matter is that the lack of guidance in arbitrational rules is in reality 
deliberate. There is a reason for the fact that arbitrators have long been trusted with 
considerable discretion in conducting the proceedings and finding workable solutions on a 
case-by-case basis. This state of affairs can be expressed in the following manner: 
“[i]t goes against the grain for arbitration practitioners to seek to prescribe the 
discretion of the tribunal on procedural matters: it is generally considered 
more advantageous to stay silent, and rely upon the flexibility of the 
procedure and the case management skill of the tribunal”.382 
The alleged need for harmonization of rules of legal privilege in international arbitration is 
usually dismissed as difficult, unrealistic383 or as outdated with reference to certain 
European codes which have regulated European lawyers for some time already.384 It has 
also been argued that harmonized or “transnational” rules would in fact not serve the 
needs of international arbitration as such rules would perhaps result in the “setting of 
lower of higher standards of legal privilege and confidentiality in comparison to standards 
applicable before national courts”385.  
Another practical problem with the idea of harmonization is that legal privilege is often 
formulated on codes of ethics enforced by Bars which are often organized locally. Should 
this setting be replaced by an international alternative, what would be the organ to 
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enforce such an international code of ethics? Thus there is a considerable risk of “empty 
letters” with every attempt to regulate without proper enforcement. Transnational 
privilege rules would have to somehow tackle the problem regarding their enforcement 
because attorneys’ codes of ethics nowadays are in significant respect built on some form 
of self-regulation and sanctioning enforced by the Bar on its members. Currently, there 
exists no international organ which could levy similar pressure on its members globally.   
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4. Conclusion 
Legal privilege is a widely acknowledged procedural right which protects the confidential 
communications between lawyer and client and causes such communications to be 
inadmissible as evidence also in international arbitral proceedings. As it is a well-
established procedural right, parties’ expectations as to its applicability in arbitral 
proceedings can be considered legitimate so that any claims made in an attempt to invoke 
legal privilege are usually justified. Legal privilege is considered a fundamental right with 
strong substantive connotations whereby arbitrators generally have to take any claims to 
legal privilege into careful consideration.  
In arbitral proceedings, claims to legal privilege are raised especially during the 
evidentiary proceedings when parties request documents and other evidence from one 
another and consequently take efforts in objecting such requests. The disclosure 
proceedings are an important element in the efforts to establish the facts of the case and 
a successful claim to legal privilege can have a significant effect on these efforts by 
blocking the admission of potentially powerful evidence. Therefore, arbitrators should 
accept legal privilege claims only when they are well founded. 
The situation can become problematic in arbitral proceedings where parties and counsel 
come from jurisdictions which have adopted significantly different approaches to legal 
privilege. Due to the fact that legal privilege is commonly based on nationally enforced 
legislation or codes of ethics, arbitrators dealing with legal privilege claims are faced with 
the difficult task of choosing which rules to apply to legal privilege. If different rules of 
privilege could potentially apply to different parties and the arbitrator proceeds to apply 
them, he is very likely to breach the principle of equal treatment, which is an arbitral 
principle of due process considered binding on any arbitrator.  
Furthermore, parties do not tend to agree on applicable privilege rules in the arbitration 
agreement, and national arbitration acts as well as institutional arbitration rules are 
similarly silent on the matter, beyond statements calling for the application of 
“appropriate” rules of legal privilege. Thus an arbitrator should use his discretionary 
powers to determine one applicable set of legal privilege rules and apply those rules to 
both parties. By applying same rules to both parties the arbitrator is less likely to leave the 
arbitral award open to challenges on the basis of due process considerations. 
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In order to determine the applicable law of legal privilege, arbitrators should first consider 
a choice of law approach to the resolution of the dilemma in order to provide for some 
predictability as to the choice being made. Arbitrators should start with the closest 
connection test, as it is a well-established standard for determining applicable laws in 
many judicial systems. The test will result in the application of the law most closely 
connected with the information at issue. Taking into consideration the legitimate 
expectations of the parties and shared notions regarding the nature and source of legal 
privilege, arbitrators should especially consider applying the law of the domicile of the 
party claiming privilege and the law of the lawyer’s professional domicile. After 
conducting an analysis of the circumstances of the case at issue, the arbitrator is likely to 
apply either one of these laws. 
Why should arbitrators consider applying these laws specifically? For one, party 
expectations may well be strongest with regards to the application of the law of the 
party’s domicile. Especially, if the majority of the confidential communications has taken 
place at the party’s domicile, the expectations of the party may be frustrated if some 
other rules of legal privilege are applied.  On the other hand, lawyers may justifiably be 
considered as the ones best informed on the scope of legal privilege and they are often 
bound by ethical standards of legal privilege regardless of who the client taking part in the 
communications is. Thus the law of the domicile of the lawyer can also be a valid choice 
when searching the applicable law of legal privilege.  
In any case, the arbitrator should refrain from applying the law of the subject matter, as 
parties should not be considered to have intended the application of its provisions on 
legal privilege in the event of a dispute. Also, the application of the domestic law of the 
place of arbitration and its provisions on privilege is unadvisable because a choice of 
arbitral seat is first and foremost seen to express a bid for neutrality and certainly not a 
choice of privilege rules. Further, any connection with the law of the current location of a 
document or that of the location of its creation will likely prove hard to sustain in disputes 
concerning international commercial relationships, due to technological considerations 
and the overall mobility of global professionals.  
If, however, the closest connection test would result in different laws being applied to 
different parties, the arbitrator is to proceed according to the most favorable privilege 
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approach. By doing so, the arbitrator will compare the laws found applicable under the 
closest connection test and choose from them the law which provides for broadest 
protection regarding the confidentiality of communications between a lawyer and his 
client. This needs to be done so as to assure the equal treatment of the parties by 
providing them access to the same procedural rights. Due process requirements will be 
sustained and the arbitrator will more likely succeed in rendering an enforceable award. 
Parties’ expectations as to the confidentiality of their communications with their lawyers 
will not be frustrated.  
Even though the most favorable privilege approach can provide quite extensive protection 
for privileged information, and thus limit the establishment of the facts of the case as well 
as the search for truth by excluding certain evidence, the approach is justified, especially 
in cases where party equality could be at risk due to differences in domestic rules of legal 
privilege. After all, legal privilege is considered a fundamental right and parties have the 
right to invoke it also in international arbitral proceedings. 
